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THE RIGHT TO DESTROY 
 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz 
 
 
 In 1999, Black’s Law Dictionary seems to have erased a long-recognized right of 
property owners. The revision went mostly unnoticed, which is perhaps unsurprising 
given its placement on page 1130 of the newly revised text. In any event, a comparison of 
the sixth and seventh edition’s text illustrates the nature of the revision: 
Owner—The person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title 
of property; proprietor. He who has dominion of a thing, real or personal, 
corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to enjoy and do with as he 
pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law permits, unless he be 
prevented by some agreement or covenant which restrains his right. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1105 (6th ed. 1990). 
Owner—One who has the right to possess, use, and convey something; a 
proprietor. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1130 (7th ed. 1999). 
The earlier definition had been remarkably stable, with virtually identical definitions 
appearing in legal dictionaries from the mid 19th-century.1 And yet, as part of an 
extensive revision, the seventh edition’s editors decided to exclude what many would 
perceive to be the most extreme incidence of property ownership—the right to destroy.  
This revision is in many ways surprising. As a matter of everyday experience, the 
right to destroy one’s own property seems firmly entrenched. Rational people discard old 
clothes, furniture, albums, and unsent letters ever day. Most of this “junk” is worth little 
                                                 
1 E.g., JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 1855) (“Owner – The owner is he who has 
dominion of a thing real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to enjoy and to do with 
as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law permits, unless he be prevented by some 
agreement or covenant which restrains his right.”). Earlier editions of the dictionary appear to have used the 
same definition. See Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 1854 WL 349 (Ala.) at *6, 60 Am. Dec. 453 (1854) 
(quoting an earlier edition’s definition of ownership). 
2 
or nothing, and so its destruction proves entirely uncontroversial. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine how a modern capitalist economy would function if owners were barred from 
destroying obsolete refrigerators, unfashionable clothes, or rough drafts of written work. 
Even in the context of valuable property, popular sentiment seems to tolerate substantial 
property destruction. For example, American cadavers are frequently buried wearing 
wedding rings, other jewelry, and attractive clothing.2 And no one objected when a 
restaurant chain recently spent $106,600 to purchase the infamous baseball that Steve 
Bartman deflected during Game 6 of the 2003 National League Championship series, 
even though the restaurant immediately announced plans to destroy the ball as a means of 
exorcising the curse that supposedly haunts the Chicago Cubs franchise.3   
That said, Black’s Law Dictionary’s apparent abrogation of the right to destroy is 
neither an accident nor an outlier. Indeed, the seventh edition’s implicit rejection of the 
right to destroy mostly tracks current trends in American law. When asked to resolve 
cases where one party seeks to destroy her property, courts have reacted with great 
hostility toward the owner’s destructive plans. Despite the existence of a norm that 
tolerates the burial of wedding rings, courts might well refuse a decedent’s humble 
request to wear such jewelry for eternity.4 If a testator orders her executor to destroy her 
home upon her death, the law will probably render the executor unable to carry out her 
wishes.5 And if a landlord requests the city’s permission to demolish a venerable but 
badly-burned building that has become an eye-sore, a teetering hazard, and a financial 
burden, the government can thwart his wishes.6 Confronted with arguably hard cases and 
high stakes, most American courts have rejected the notion that an owner has the right to 
destroy that which is his.  
                                                 
2 Ronnie Caplane, The Ring Is Not the Thing, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at 4; Lane DeGregory, 
‘Til Death Parts Us, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 1F; A.J. Holly & Sons, About the Funeral, 
available in http://www.hollyfuneralhome.com/html/funeral_before.html (visited Dec. 29, 2003); 
Rochester Funeral Homes, Resource Guide: Funeral Planning Checklist, available in 
http://www.rochesterfunderalhomes.com/Resource_Guides/Funeral_Planning_Checklist.html (visited Dect. 
29, 2003). 
3 AP, Infamous Cubs Ball to Be Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003 at B16. 
4 In re Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 373 (Common Pleas 1974). 
5 Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
6 J.C. & Assoc v. District of Columbia Bd. of App. & Rev., 778 A.2d 296, 308-09 (D.C. 2001). 
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This trend of substantially curtailing property owners’ destruction rights was 
given further momentum recently by one of the nation’s most capable property scholars. 
Joseph Sax’s book, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, argues that the American law is far 
too deferential to the wishes of those who wish to destroy property that might have 
cultural significance.7 Sax advocates depriving owners of the right to destroy works of 
art, literary works, items of antiquity, correspondence with public officials, and newly 
built, architecturally important, buildings. Indeed, the logic of Sax’s approach even seems 
applicable to famous, cursed baseballs.   
In advocating further substantial limitations on the owner’s right to destroy, Sax 
was not picking a fight with anyone in particular. The right to destroy presently lacks a 
constituency within the American legal academy. This paper responds to Sax and the 
various judicial anti-destruction rulings by presenting a qualified defense of the owner’s 
right to destroy valuable resources.8 On my account, empowering owners to destroy their 
property can promote important expressive interests, spur creative activity, and enhance 
social welfare. Moreover, a relatively laissez faire attitude toward property destruction 
avoids the enormous transactions costs that would be incurred in a Saxist world. That is 
not to say that the right to destroy should be absolute. Indeed, my paper identifies a few 
contexts and considerations, ignored by Sax and the courts, in which restrictions on the 
destruction of property are highly desirable.  
The ambition of this paper, then, is to consider more broadly two questions: (1) 
What interests are furthered by permitting an owner to destroy his property? and (2) 
When should those interests give way to societal concerns about wasted resources and 
negative externalities?   
Part I of the paper sets forth the historical treatment of the right to destroy and 
explores some conceptual difficulties inherent in any discussion of property destruction. 
                                                 
7 JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL 
TREASURES (2001). Sax’s book does not discuss most of the cases that are analyzed in this article. 
8 By this I mean to limit my topic to instances where the sole fee simple owner of a useful resource wishes 
to destroy it. In other words, I am not discussing instances of waste by a life tenant, the destruction of co-
owned property by one owner, A’s destruction of B’s property, or the government’s destruction of private 
property owned by a citizen. These are all interesting topics about which much has been written.  
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Under Roman law, the right to destroy or abuse—the jus abudtendi—served an important 
function of demarcating the boundaries of the owner’s rights in property. Under this 
conception, destruction functioned as the most extreme recognized property right, and so 
the owner who destroys his property necessarily had the right to use it in less extreme 
fashions. Blackstone’s characterization of the English common law echoed similar 
themes, limiting the owner’s right to destroy only in those cases where destruction 
occurred in a manner that threatened the property rights of third parties. In this sense, 
Blackstone rejected John Locke’s arguably narrower notion of ownership. In the 
twentieth century, the right to destroy fell out of favor, and the most recent literature has 
argued that such a right, if it exists at all, should be substantially circumscribed on public 
policy grounds. Part I concludes by offering a definition of property destruction that 
steers the reader toward the interesting, contested cases of destruction. 
Part II examines the major argument that courts have put forth to justify 
limitations on the right to destroy one’s own property—the fear that valuable resources 
will be wasted. Most of the case law that limits the right to destroy does so on this basis. 
While waste-prevention is a valid basis for restricting one’s right to destroy, an analysis 
of the case law suggests that courts often fail to appreciate the ways in which protecting 
the right to destroy can enhance social welfare by protecting privacy, creating open 
spaces, encouraging innovation and creation, and promoting candor and risk-taking. A 
critical reading of the cases suggests that the various anti-waste rules that courts have 
promulgated might well have resulted in diminished social welfare by discouraging the 
creation of the valuable properties that the courts are so keen on protecting. 
Part III examines a thread that runs through much of the right-to-destroy case law. 
Most litigated cases involving property destruction involve efforts by an owner to destroy 
property via will. The applicable conventional wisdom, expressed in the case law and 
scholarship, consists of the idea that decedents’ destructive will provisions should be 
invalidated because the dead had “nothing to lose” by destroying their property via will. 
Hence, the self-interest that keeps most living owners from destroying their valuable 
property during life fails to deter posthumous destruction. I argue that this conventional 
wisdom is wrong. An application of the law governing future interests demonstrates that 
5 
when a testator executes a will providing for the destruction of property following her 
death, she makes an immediate economic sacrifice because of her inability to alienate a 
remainder interest following her life estate. To the extent that there is a moral hazard 
here, it arises if an unsophisticated testator does not recognize the present value of a 
future interest in property he wishes to destroy. Accordingly, I propose a novel “safe 
harbor” rule whereby testators who market a future interest in their property and elect to 
forego the future interest’s market value would be entitled to destroy valuable property 
via will. This provision not only solves the moral hazard problem, but it also addresses 
the other objections to permitting posthumous destruction—namely, concerns about 
modification, social norms, transaction costs, and the government condemnation process. 
Part IV explores the intangible benefits associated with property destruction. 
When rational people destroy valuable property, they often do so because of deeply held 
expressive or religious interests. History provides many examples in which valuable 
pieces of property have been destroyed by owners who used this destruction to gain 
attention for a cause or message. Relatedly, the law’s willingness to tolerate the 
widespread destruction of transplantable organs can only be defended on the basis of pro-
destruction religious and moral sentiments held by large segments of the population. The 
paper argues that under certain circumstances, these expressive or religious interests 
ought to trump the social waste that results from the destruction of valuable property. It 
then suggests that the United States’ Visual Artists’ Rights Act’s anti-destruction 
provisions provide a useful model for reconciling society’s interests in preserving 
irreplaceable works of art and permitting owners to criticize art or ideas embodied therein 
through destructive acts. Finally, the part concludes by exploring whether those who 
create properties, particularly intellectual property, ought to have expanded destruction 
rights. 
A conclusion in Part V argues that the law’s pendulum is swinging too far toward 
restrictions on the destruction of property. It then reviews the case law, and proposes 
more satisfying rules for courts to apply in controversies where one party invokes the 
right to destroy that which is his. 
  
6 
I. Fundamentals of the Right to Destroy 
 The right to destroy evidently received more attention in antiquity than it does 
today. It appears that the right’s historical and linguistic connection to the Roman law 
right to abuse one’s property has caused the right to destroy to fall into disfavor via a 
form of guilt by association.   
A. Jus Abutendi 
 Under Roman Law, the ability to destroy one’s own property was considered an 
important right of ownership. A Roman’s property rights consisted of the jus utendi 
fruendi abutendi, the rights to use the principal, use the income generated by the 
property, or completely consume and destroy the property, respectively.9 To have these 
rights with respect to a thing made someone that thing’s owner under Roman law.10 The 
Roman attitude toward private property was often shorthanded to jus utendi et abutendi—
an owner had the right to use, or to misuse, his private property, without the state’s 
interference.11 
 A few early American civil law decisions picked up the notion of the jus abutendi 
and incorporated it into their understanding of the property owner’s basic rights. They 
viewed the owner’s right to destroy his property as the most extreme use of property 
imaginable, and suggested that if a land owner had the right to destroy property, he 
                                                 
9 Max Radin, Fundamental Conceptions of the Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207, 209 (1924-25). 
10 Id. at 210. 
11 Some commentators define “abutendi” with respect to misuse of property; others have it refer to the 
destruction of property. Anton Hermann Chroust & Robert J. Affeldt, The Problem of Private Property 
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 34 MARQUETTE L. REV. 151, 175 (1950-51). By the later years of the 
Roman empire, the extreme version of the right to abuse was scaled back somewhat. Id. at 175 n.131. This 
was particularly true with respect to the owner’s treatment of his slaves. Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law: 
An Anglo-American Perspective, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 591, 598 (1996) (“Masters who murder their slaves 
are guilty of crime. But if a slave dies during a beating, there will be no investigation, even if it appears that 
the owner intended to kills the slave. If, however, the owner employed means such as poison or threw the 
slave over a cliff, the owner will be charged with murder. Even in this latter case, slaves and freedmen 
cannot accuse their owner. It is suspect that Roman owners were seldom convicted of murdering their 
slaves.”) Watson argues that the basis for these restrictions stemmed not from an interest in protecting slave 
welfare or preserving public order, but from a desire to prevent an owner from wasting a valuable asset that 
his heirs might otherwise inherit. Id. at 596.  
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certainly had the right to use or dispose of it in a less dramatic manner.12 Several other 
American decisions eschewed the Latin phraseology, referring instead to a property 
owner’s common law “right to destroy” that which was his.13  
 The English courts were rather sympathetic toward the destruction of property as 
well, at least according to Blackstone’s Commentaries. Indeed, Blackstone read the 
common law of property so as to make it compatible with his absolutist conception of 
ownership—“the right of property [is] that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.”14 The common law’s purported embrace of the 
jus abutendi is more precisely indicated in Blackstone’s discussion of arson. Blackstone 
regarded arson as an “offence of very great malignity, and much more pernicious to the 
public than simple theft . . . because in simple theft the thing stolen only changes its 
master, but still remains in effe for the benefit of the public, whereas by burning the very 
substance is absolutely destroyed.”15 This hostility to wasteful destruction 
notwithstanding, Blackstone suggests that under the common law a property owner is 
free to burn down his own house, so long as the fire does not threaten to spread to other 
people’s property: 
The offense of arson (strictly so called) may be committed by willfully 
setting fire to one’s own house, provided one’s neighbor’s house is 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055, 36 Am. Rep. 278, 1880 WL 8529, at *6 (“Suffice it 
to say, that the civil law recognizes [the right of testamentary disposition] as a clear and distinct corollary 
of the right of property, jus utendi et abutendi, under which the owner, provided he harm no other, may 
destroy or annihilate that which belongs to him. If he may destroy it, and thereby defeat all possible control 
of the law, it is difficult to perceive why, in exercising the option of leaving it in existence, he should not 
have the right of determining its disposition after his death.”). 
13 See, e.g., Cass v. Home Tobacco Warehouse Co., 223 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ky. 1949) (noting a property 
owner’s common law right to destroy his building); State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 648 (Utah 1983) 
(Stewart J., dissenting) (“Surely an attribute of ownership of property is the right to destroy it unless it is 
done for the purpose of defrauding or injuring another in his person or property. One who destroys his own 
habitation must surely be considered to have a ‘license or privilege’ – indeed a right – to destroy it.”); Voss 
v. State, 236 N.W. 128, 130 (Wisc. 1931) (rejecting an arsonist’s claim that his conviction for burning his 
own property was unconstitutional in light of its infringement of an asserted “right to destroy one’s own 
property”). 
14 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (facsimile ed. 1979) (1766). 
15 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 220 (facsimile ed. 1979) (1769). 
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thereby also burnt; but if no mischief is done but to one’s own, it does not 
amount to felony, though the fire was kindled with intent to burn 
another’s. . . . However such willful firing one’s own house, in a town, is a 
high misdemeanor, and punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, and 
perpetual sureties for the good behavior.16  
Blackstone thus takes the position that one is free to set fire to one’s house, provided that 
no third parties are thereby injured or exposed to danger, but if neighbors, tenants, or 
other third parties are threatened because of their proximity to the blazing building, the 
burning is a crime.17  
 John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is sometimes interpreted to have 
questioned the existence of a right to destroy property. Locke wrote that as “much as 
anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his 
labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to 
others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.”18 Locke thus invoked 
divine justice as a basis for restricting the destruction of property—a bold claim, given 
the prevalence of property destruction in the Bible that was explicitly designed to 
demonstrate piety and curry God’s favor.19 In any event, it seems clear that under a 
Lockean conception of waste, it is improper for a man to kill a wild animal and then leave 
it to rot in the forest.   
 While Locke’s hostility to certain forms of property destruction seems 
unambiguous, his text leaves a great deal of uncertainty regarding his attitude toward 
destruction writ large. Does a man have the right to destroy a property after mixing quite 
substantial amounts of his labor with it? Does a man have the right to destroy his 
dwelling after living in it for decades and extracting much of its value? Does a human 
have the right to destroy property that he created out of thin air (e.g., a poem he 
composed)? If not, then why doesn’t man have an obligation to avoid wasting any of his 
                                                 
16 Id. at * 221. 
17 Id. at *221-22. 
18 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 130 (Mark Goldie ed. 1993). 
19 See, e.g., GENESIS 22:13-:14; EXODUS 29:38-42. 
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labor as well? These questions go unanswered by Locke. Indeed, some of Locke’s 
readers deem such questions irrelevant because the Lockean prohibition against waste 
disappears as soon as man joins other men in a civil society.20 Perhaps because of all this 
ambiguity, Post-Locke jurists and scholars seemed unmoved by Lockean condemnations 
of waste. American courts have evidently ignored Locke’s language regarding spoilage or 
destruction, having failed to quote from it altogether.  
In an often-cited 1939 essay, Roscoe Pound identified six rights of property 
ownership, the last of which was a jus abutendi right to destroy or abuse.21 Pound 
referred to the right to destroy as a liberty to act “as one likes, free of legal restraint.”22 
Pound characterized then-recent jurisprudence as limiting the power to abuse, but did not 
discuss whether these same limits were being imposed on the power to destroy.23 Indeed, 
it is not clear that he differentiated between abuse and destruction. Yet, upon reflection, 
abuse and destruction cannot be conflated. One can destroy property without abusing it 
(e.g., burning a confidential letter), and one can abuse property without destroying it 
(e.g., whipping a donkey mercilessly). While there are good reasons to limit the right to 
abuse property, I argue here that destroying valuable properties is sometimes socially 
beneficial.  
                                                 
20 Leo Strauss, On Locke’s Doctrine of Natural Right, 61 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 475, 494 (1952).  
21 Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939) 
(“According to the civilians, property involves six rights: a jus posseidendi or right of possessing, a right in 
the strict sense; a jus prohibendi or right of excluding others, also a right in the strict sense; a jus 
disponendi or right of disposition, what we should not call a legal power; a jus utendi or right of using, 
what we now call a liberty; a jus fruendi or right of enjoying the fruits and profits; and a jus abutendi or 
right of destroying or injuring if one likes – the last two also what today we should call liberties.”). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. (“As to the liberty of abusing, both courts and legislators took this in hand long ago. The Roman law 
early forbade cruel treatment of slaves. The law has long forbidden cruelty to domestic animals. Statutes 
and judicial decisions have dealt with spite fences and malicious diversions of water out of pure spite. 
While English law has not been willing to create a general liability for malicious exercise of jus utendim, 
yet is has become willing to prevent exercise of that liberty out of spite to the detriment of a business 
carried on by a neighbor.”). 
10 
 Evidently dissatisfied with Pound’s list of six, Tony Honore engaged in a more 
ambitious effort to articulate the incidences of property ownership, identifying eleven in 
his 1961 essay, Ownership.24 One of these includes the right to destroy property: 
The right to the capital consists in the power to alienate the thing and the 
liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it . . . The latter 
liberty need not be regarded as unrestricted; but a general provision 
requiring things to be conserved in the public interest, so far as not 
consumed by use in the ordinary way, would perhaps be inconsistent with 
the liberal idea of ownership.25 
That is essentially all Honore wrote about the right to destroy.26 He recognized that the 
right to destroy may well be an essential part of the property owner’s rights, but he left 
the reader wondering about why that is so. I will argue that there are indeed strong 
justifications, liberal and otherwise, for permitting individuals to destroy their property. 
But since Honore never elaborated on the point, and very few thoughtful scholars have 
given the issue much thought, these justifications remain rather elusive.27  
 With the recent publication of Joseph Sax’s Playing Darts with a Rembrandt,28 
the right to destroy one’s own valuable property has received its most hostile treatment to 
date. On Sax’s account, an art collector does not exactly own a valuable painting that 
hangs in her living room. Rather, she is the work’s steward, and ought to incur permanent 
                                                 
24 A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (A.G. Guest ed. 1961).  
25 Id. at 118. 
26 Honore also noted that “[m]ost people do not willfully destroy permanent assets; hence the power of 
alienation is the more important aspect of the owner’s right to the capital of the thing owned.” Id. It should 
be noted that Honore served as an academic adviser to the seventh edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, 
which seems to regard the right to destroy as peripheral or nonexistent. See supra text accompanying note 
1. 
27 By far the best discussion of the American case law regarding the destruction of one’s own property is 
contained in Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 
(1999). Hirsch’s article advocates a more unified approach to bequests for purposes, and his discussion of 
cases involving the destruction of property via will is contained in a section dealing with anti-social or 
bizarre bequests. See id. at 70-84. Other papers dealing with similar topics are Frances Carlisle, Destruction 
of Pets by Will Provision, 16 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 894 (1981); and Abigail J. Sykas, 
Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by 
Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911 (2001).   
28 SAX, supra note 7. 
11 
legal obligations to preserve the work and make it accessible to scholars, art lovers, and 
members of the general public.29 While Sax spends far more time discussing the problem 
of destroyed cultural property than the solution, he appears sympathetic to the 
enforcement of legal rules that bar the owner of a work of such property from destroying 
it, except in those cases where its owner is the artist or writer who created it in the first 
place.30 Sax would abandon altogether the traditional notion of jus abutendi with respect 
to valuable or potentially valuable cultural property. Instead, Sax favors limited 
ownership rights: Owners of cultural property can continue to use it for their personal 
enjoyment, but the law will prohibit destructive uses that deprive the general public or 
future generations of a potential cultural resource. 
B. The Nature of the Right 
While the right to destroy one’s property has ancient origins, the functional 
justifications for that right have not been well-developed in the literature. Indeed, the 
affirmative right-to-destroy literature has not progressed far beyond early Roman Law 
and its brief modern restatements by Pound and Honore. Until the publication of Sax’s 
book, the right to destroy had been ignored by most scholars, while a great deal of 
attention was been lavished on some of the other rights that Pound and Honore 
recognized—the right to exclude, the right to alienate, the right to use, the right to 
testamentary disposition, the right to mortgage, and the like.   
Why have these other rights gotten so much attention? The answer may stem, in 
large part, from the high frequency with which they are placed at issue in litigation. There 
are, by contrast, relatively few published opinions that squarely implicate an owner’s 
right to destroy his property. At first glance, this should not be surprising. A new 
homeowner is more likely to want to exclude outsiders from his home than he is to want 
to raze it. Less valuable kinds of properties are destroyed all the time, but the low stakes 
involved and restrictions on third-party standing combine to keep any resulting 
disagreements out of the courts.  
                                                 
29 Id. at 68-72.  
30 Id. at 200-01.  
12 
That said, the relatively small number of right-to-destroy cases that have been 
litigated provide a rich opportunity to illuminate property law’s first principles. The right 
to destroy property is, after all, often an extreme exercise of some of the more widely 
recognized sticks in the bundle of rights. The right to destroy is an extreme version of the 
right to exclude; by destroying a vase, I permanently exclude both third parties and 
myself from using it in the future. The right to destroy is also an extreme version of the 
right to use; by destroying a piece of jewelry, I do not merely use it—I use it up. Finally, 
we might understand the right to destroy as an extreme right to control subsequent 
alienation. By destroying property, the owner can prevent it from ever being resold or 
used in a manner that displeases him without running afoul of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. Indeed, the justifications traditionally given for inalienability rules are both 
similar to31 and different from32 the justifications given for restricting the destruction of 
one’s property.  
Relatedly, a discourse on this most extreme property right quickly implicates 
some of the most interesting, fundamental, and contentious questions in property law. 
What is the nature of ownership? What obligations does a property owner owe his 
                                                 
31 The law’s hostility to the owner’s right to destroy property perhaps stems from the widely-accepted view 
that restraints on alienation of property are inadvisable. Richard Epstein, Margaret Jane Radin, and others 
have defended restrictions on alienability in particular circumstances, see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why 
Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). While there is not enough space here to rehash the many interesting arguments 
in the literature, it is worth noting that some of the same reasons that prompt society to impose 
inalienability rules may prompt it to enact anti-destruction rules. For example, paternalistic concerns may 
explain why society bars an individual from selling her kidney (alienation) or taking her own life 
(destruction). And concerns about negative externalities may explain why the law bars both the sale of 
some sex acts and the destruction of some valuable paintings. 
32 Hostility to restraints on alienation and openness to property owners’ destruction of their own property 
might be able to coexist peacefully in some cases. Part of the modern hostility to restraints on alienation 
stems from the restraints’ tendency to keep a resource away from its highest-value user. Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1259 
(1985).  As I will argue below, the destroyer of property is sometimes its highest-value user, and is using 
the resource to obtain privacy, media attention, reputational protection, open space, or some other 
economically valuable resource. Moreover, the objections to restraints on alienation might stem in part 
from additional factors, including the transaction costs of enforcing inalienability rules and the 
demoralization costs experienced by the would-be owner who wants to put a property to its highest-value 
use but is prevented from doing so. In both these instances, the destruction of a resource may actually fare 
better than a restraint on the alienation of that resource. Once a resource is destroyed, the costs of keeping it 
destroyed are generally zero. Furthermore, a destroyed object is generally out of sight, and out of mind, and 
so the would-be purchaser who did not observe the resource’s destruction would not encounter the 
frustration associated with seeing a useful object and not being able to use it. 
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neighbors? Are the foundations of property law libertarian or instrumentalist? To what 
extent is a private property system wealth maximizing? What are the appropriate roles of 
the dead hand and the interests of future generations? Each of the right-to-destroy cases 
implicates some of these important questions.33 
There is also an important sense in which property destruction raises one-of-a-
kind issues. Scholars are conditioned to think about property law as the way in which 
society divides up resources that have perpetual life. Much of property law, most notably 
those provisions dealing with future interests, presumes that the resource in question will 
survive forever. But land is the only perpetual form of property. Chattels, fixtures, 
corporate entities, currency, and intellectual property can all be destroyed, meaning that 
an owner potentially has the ability to deprive property of its perpetual life. The law of 
property destruction, then, is the law that governs whether and under what circumstances 
the owner may deprive a thing of its immortality.   
C. What Is Destruction?  
Before proceeding to the heart of the paper, a conceptual clarification is 
necessary. For property destruction is harder to define that it might appear at first glance. 
On the broadest reading of a right to destroy, an owner destroys property every 
time he eats a banana, kills a plant by watering it too infrequently, falls asleep watching 
television instead of working, or leaves a guest room empty instead of renting it to 
visitors. Such examples reference a right to destroy that includes both consuming non-
durable assets and failing to exploit an economic opportunity fully. Under this definition, 
human beings constantly destroy property, and virtually any anti-destruction rule would 
be entirely unworkable.  
Narrower conceptions of the right to destroy are possible. Destruction might be 
defined as eliminating all the value in a productive resource. On this understanding of 
destruction, demolishing a historic castle would not be destructive, as long as the rubble 
                                                 
33 For those reasons, the omission of the right-to-destroy cases from Property law casebooks is 
disappointing. Among the leading casebooks, I believe that only Dwyer and Menell’s Property Law and 
Policy includes a case on the right to destroy. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW & 
POLICY 384-92 (1998).   
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was used by others for building materials. Nor would suicide be destructive, so long as 
the deceased’s organs were harvested for transplantation in others. Now the universe of 
destructive acts has shrunk beyond recognition. Every act of obliteration surely produces 
at least a small benefit to someone or something—consider the nihilist who takes 
pleasure in learning that a great building has been destroyed.   
Neither the broad nor the narrow economic definition of property destruction 
seems particularly attractive, and even a middle-course economic definition of property 
destruction (eliminating most of the value of an existing asset) will be overbroad and 
underbroad simultaneously. As an analytical matter, then, the right to destroy is a 
confusing and elusive concept. 
Moving from economics to sociology, one finds that different historical eras, 
cultures, and subpopulations have varying conceptions about the meaning of destruction. 
Slaughtering an edible animal and setting it ablaze, to be consumed by no one, was 
considered a righteous act in biblical times,34 but most major religions frown on the 
practice today. Similarly, burial practices vary among the different cultures of the world, 
with societies reaching quite different conclusions about what property, if any, should be 
destroyed along with a deceased person’s body.35 While modernity has curtailed the 
destruction of property that accompanies death, property destruction retains cultural 
significance throughout much of the world. The piñata is a staple of childhood festivities 
in many Latin American cultures, and Americans regularly spend hundreds of dollars on 
elaborate ice sculptures for business functions and other important gatherings. Different 
communities within a society will disagree about the meaning of destruction too. While 
an artist would regard the nonconsensual separation of her painting into multiple parts as 
                                                 
34 See supra note 19. 
35 See, e.g., CLARE GITTINGS, DEATH, BURIAL, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1984); 
LESLIE V. GRINSELL, BARROW, PYRAMID, AND TOMB: ANCIENT BURIAL CUSTOMS IN EGYPT, THE 
MEDITERRANEAN, AND THE BRITISH ISLES (1975). 
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destruction of the work, an entrepreneur might regard such activity as socially beneficial 
unbundling.36  
Given these considerations, there can be no perfect definition of destruction. For 
reasons that will become apparent in Part III of the paper, I adopt a relatively narrow, 
economics-oriented definition of property destruction for the purposes of this paper. 
Destruction occurs when an owner’s acts or omissions eliminate the value of all future 
interests in a valuable, durable thing. This definition is more doctrinal than analytical, as 
it relies on an admittedly imprecise notion of value. That said, a definition that steers 
clear of bananas, clay pigeons, castle rubble, and leisure time will focus the reader’s 
attention on the contested, and therefore interesting, exercises of the right to destroy.  
II. Property Destruction and Wasted Resources 
 Based on a reading of recent judicial opinions, it appears that the conventional 
wisdom has turned against permitting the property owner to destroy valuable property. 
Courts have identified two closely related bases for restricting the right to destroy. While 
excising theological strains from Locke’s anti-waste argument, they have embraced his 
notion that society must not tolerate the waste of valuable resources. Moreover, courts 
have stressed the negative externalities that might be associated with an individual 
owner’s destruction.  
A. Waste of Resources and Other Externalities 
The concern about wasting societal resources is, by far, the most commonly 
voiced justification for restricting an owner’s ability to destroy her property. In cases 
where a living person seeks to destroy her property, the courts express concern about the 
diminution of resources available to society as a whole. Where someone tries to destroy 
her property via will, the court’s focus is generally on preventing a loss to the estate and 
the beneficiaries. In all circumstances, however, the court is concerned about the negative 
externalities that would result from respecting property owners’ right to destroy.  
                                                 
36 136 Cong. Rec. E3111-02 at H3115 (statement of Rep. Markey); Timothy M. Casey, Note, The Visual 
Artists Rights Act, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 86 (1991); Charles Ossola, Law for Art’s Sake, 
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 27.  
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Perhaps the most prominent set of cases prompting concerns about waste involve 
efforts by landowners to destroy their homes via will. The leading case of this kind is 
Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Company.37 The Eyerman court was called upon to decide 
whether a provision in the will of Louise Woodruff Johnston ought to be enforced. The 
will directed her executor to have Johnston’s attractive house on St. Louis’s Kingsbury 
Place razed, the land underneath it sold, and the proceeds from the land sale transferred to 
the residue of the estate.38 Johnston’s beneficiaries evidently did not object to the razing 
of the home,39 but the neighbors did, and one month after Johnston’s death, they 
convinced the city government to have Kingsbury Place declared a historic landmark.40 
The neighbors then sought injunctive relief to prevent Johnston’s executor from razing 
the home, arguing, inter alia, that the destruction would depress property values in the 
neighborhood.41   
The court held that the provision directing the executor to destroy the home was 
unenforceable on public policy grounds.42 In the Court’s words, “[d]estruction of the 
house harms the neighbors, detrimentally affects the community, causes monetary loss in 
excess of $39,000.00 to the estate and is without benefit to the dead woman.” Such 
destruction, the court held, was simply intolerable in a “well-ordered society.”43 While 
this waste of resources and damage to third parties cautioned against permitting Mrs. 
Johnston’s wishes to be carried out, the court saw no countervailing justification for 
respecting those wishes. “No reason, good or bad, is suggested by the will or the record 
                                                 
37 Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). For additional discussions 
of Eyerman and some of the other cases cited herein, see Hirsch, supra note 27, at 69-83; Sykas, supra note 
27, at 936-39; and Teresa Wear, Recent Case, Wills – Direction in Will to Destroy Estate Property Violates 
Public Policy, 41 MO. L. REV. 309, 309-14 (1976). 
38 Id. at 211. 
39 Id. at 218 (Clemens, J., dissenting).  
40 Id. at 219. The applicable landmark law evidently did not itself bar owners from destroying their 
landmarked properties. 
41 Id. at 211. 
42 Id. at 217. 
43 Id. 
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for the eccentric condition.”44 Seeing nothing but caprice in Mrs. Johnston’s instructions, 
the court refused to respect them.  
Most of the cases are in accord with Eyerman. For example, the In re Pace court 
invalidated a will provision directing the demolition of two homes on the grounds that 
their destruction would reduce neighborhood property values, lower the property tax 
base, and harm the estate’s beneficiaries.45 In National City Bank v. Case Western 
Reserve University, the court held that a will provision directing the destruction of a 
home was not contrary to public policy, but nevertheless directed the sale of the home to 
the local historical society.46 The only reported case in which a court actually ordered the 
razing of a home in accordance with a will provision presented a strange set of facts. The 
municipality that sought, on public policy grounds, to prevent the testator’s executor from 
razing the home had in previous years tried to demolish the same home as part of an 
urban renewal project.47  
                                                 
44 Id. at 214. 
45 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492-93 (Surrogate Court 1977). 
46 369 N.E.2d 814, 818-19 (Ohio Common Pleas 1976). The court’s reasoning in this case was interesting. 
The court heard testimony on the testator’s motivations for destroying her valuable, architecturally 
significant home. Such testimony revealed that her “motive and purpose was to prevent the house from 
being used as a rooming house or for commercial or business purposes like many of the other former 
homes in the immediate neighborhood.” In the court’s view, that made the Eyerman case distinguishable. 
“The razing of the Vair house will not, like the razing of the house in the Eyerman case, be a first step 
toward the deterioration of an exclusively residential neighborhood, but rather would be an effective means 
of preventing a beloved home from debasement to rooming house, business or commercial uses, as has 
already happened to many of the homes in the neighborhood.” Id. at 818. This analysis seems strange at 
first glance, as the court is essentially holding that permanently preventing a building from being put to its 
highest value use does not violate public policy. The court’s analysis will perhaps make more sense in light 
of the expressive justifications for a right to destroy, discussed infra Section IV. 
 If pop culture is any indication, then the living sometimes destroy valuable commodities as a 
tribute to the dead. In Titanic, currently the highest grossing film ever, the elderly protagonist Rose DeWitt 
Bukater, played by Gloria Stewart, melodramatically tosses the priceless “Heart of the Ocean” necklace 
into the Atlantic, evidently as a tribute to her deceased former lover, Jack Dawson. A discussion of why 
Rose might have destroyed the priceless necklace can be found on the Internet at 
<http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=0002MW> (visited July 17, 2003).   
47 In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Surrogate’s Court 1998) (“The Beck home, which Anna 
Beck personally treasured and fought to preserve from the city’s very own wrecking crews, was . . . clearly 
titled to her. At her death, it was her’s [sic] to dispose of as she intended. Ironically, the agency which now 
claims to champion its preservation on the basis of an undefined public interest, was the very same agency 
that once went to court seeking its demolition under the banner of urban renewal. That twist of fate is not 
lost on the court.”). 
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Courts also strain to construe written instruments in a manner that allows them to 
avoid acquiescing in the destruction of property. In re Jones involved a will provision 
whereby the testator willed his real estate to the Society for the Protection of New 
Hampshire Forests, “subject to the condition that all of the buildings on the homestead, 
with the exception of the original house, shall be dismantled and disposed of by my 
executor as he, in his discretion, may deem best.”48 With respect to the remaining house, 
the will continued, “My executor shall have the further power . . . to decide whether the 
original house is to be preserved for use and benefit of the Society or whether it shall also 
be dismantled and removed.”49 Although these words eliminated any ambiguity as to 
what the testator wanted done with all his buildings but one, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court somehow managed to construe this language to give the executor 
discretion to sell all the buildings to a third party.50 This was true even though the 
demolition of the buildings was consistent with the forest-loving decedent’s intent to 
allow the forests on the property to reclaim the land where the other dwellings had once 
stood. 
Curiously, at least one court has used some of the same public policy 
justifications to invalidate will provisions that seek to prevent the destruction of existing 
buildings. In Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated a 
will that sought to bar the construction of new buildings exceeding three stories on the 
site of an existing three-story building.51 The court noted that, given the building’s 
location, and the cost of maintaining the old building, the construction of a newer, taller 
building may well be necessary to maximize the value of the land.52 The court noted that 
the restrictions were to remain in place for 75 years, and viewed their enforcement as 
intolerable: 
                                                 
48 389 A.2d 436, 437 (N.H. 1978). 
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 438. Exercising extreme creativity, the court noted that, “[i]n essence, such a conveyance amounts 
to no more than a constructive dismantling of the buildings with the materials preserved and later given to 
the museum for reconstruction on the same land.” Id. So, assuming the executor had the power to demolish 
and then rebuild these buildings, the executor could presumably opt for the functional equivalent of 
refusing to demolish the buildings in the first place.  
51 135 A. 555 (Conn. 1926). 
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The effect of such conditions . . . would carry a serious threat against the 
proper growth and development of the parts of the city in which the lands 
in question are situated. The restrictions militate too strongly against the 
interests of the beneficiaries and the public welfare to be sustained, 
particularly when it is remembered that they are designed to benefit no 
one, and are harmful to all persons interested, and we hold them invalid as 
against public policy.53 
The Brown court deemed behavior that modern observers would consider preservationist 
to be destructive. Perhaps it should not be surprising that in the 50 years between Brown 
and Eyerman, the courts’ emphasis shifted from preventing testators’ preservation efforts 
to preventing testators from destroying buildings. After all, societal preferences regarding 
the desirability of historic preservation shifted substantially during that era.54 More 
surprising is the fact that the Eyerman court, in holding that the provision destroying a 
house in Kingsbury Place was contrary to public policy, cited Brown with approval and 
relied on its reasoning!55 
 In these home destruction cases, a number of third-party interests were invoked to 
justify restricting a testator’s right to destroy a home—the economic interests of the 
will’s beneficiaries, the neighbors’ economic interests in neighborhood continuity, the 
public’s interest in property tax revenues, and the community’s need for housing. Yet 
public policy rationales that seem plain in one era evaporate during another era. Brown’s 
effort to preserve a venerable building via will seems like an act of preservation, not 
economic destruction, as the court deemed it. Jones’s forest preservation sentiment makes 
more sense to the contemporary reader familiar with the goals of the environmentalist 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 Id. at 564. 
53 Id. 
54 ANTHONY M. TUNG, PRESERVING THE WORLD’S GREAT CITIES: THE DESTRUCTION AND RENEWAL OF 
THE HISTORIC METROPOLIS 346-49 (2001). 
55 Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 216-17 (quoting and relying on Brown). A parallel redefinition of the notion of 
destruction has occurred in property law generally. The Lockean anti-waste proviso was invoked by those 
who sought to deny Native Americans’ claims to land on the ground that they were wasting the land by 
failing to develop it. See Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 DAYTON L. 
REV. 437, 445 (1998). 
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movement than it did to a New Hampshire court in 1978. The various homeowners’ gifts 
of open space in built-up urban neighborhoods might seem like an act of generosity, not 
capriciousness, to the modern reader.56  
A different set of public policy considerations emerges in cases involving the 
destruction of chattel property via burial. In the case of Meksras Estate, Eva Meksras 
wrote a will directing her executor to deposit her diamonds, other jewelry, and other 
items of value in her casket for burial.57 The property slated for burial had considerable 
value.58 Invoking public policy to invalidate the will provision, the court speculated that 
permitting the burial would be an invitation to grave robbers, who would have access to 
the will, given its status as a public record.59 In the court’s words: 
If a practice is developed in our State to foster the burying of valuable 
with a deceased, our cemeteries like the tombs of the Pharoahs [sic] will 
be ravaged and violated. The loved ones of the deceased will experience 
the horror of the desecration, looting and destruction of burial grounds, 
heaping indignities on the memory of the dead.60 
Deviating from the home destruction cases, the Meksras court did not mention waste of 
scarce resources as a basis for denying the decedent’s request.61 Meksras is apparently the 
only published American case on the question of the legality of burying valuable chattels 
                                                 
56 See Hirsch, supra note 27, at 72 n 141 (“Whereas it is a commonplace among realtors that expensive 
homes raise the value of less expensive adjoining ones by increasing the attractiveness of a street or 
neighborhood, there is another side to the economic coin – open spaces in a neighborhood are also 
attractive, and, as an elementary exercise in supply and demand, the fewer homes available in a 
neighborhood, the higher the price of those left standing.”). 
57 In re Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 371 (Common Pleas 1974). 
58 Id. at 372. 
59 Id. at 373. 
60 Id.  
61 Given the court’s rationale, the failure to mention waste was appropriate. If grave robbers were likely to 
reclaim the valuable jewelry buried in graves, then the resources would not be wasted from society’s 
perspective. Rather, they would be recycled through the black market or returned to the heirs of the 
decedent if recovered by the authorities. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So.2d 601, 604-05 (La. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that artifacts recovered from Native American burial sites are the property of the descendants of 
those tribes). Indeed, if one whole-heartedly embraces a “waste avoidance” theory with respect to buried 
property, then one begins to see the actions of grave robbers in a rather positive light.  
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along with a cadaver, and it comes from a lower court in Pennsylvania. This is puzzling, 
given the disparity between its holding and prevalent social norms, whereby people are 
often buried wearing their wedding rings, expensive clothing, and other items of 
considerable value.62 Indeed, the reported cases dealing with grave robbing suggest that 
the Meksras rule is not adhered to universally.63  
 The Meksras court explicitly supposes that grave robbers will examine wills at the 
county courthouse and then target those graves that contain buried treasures. This 
premise only seems plausible if courthouse employees are unable to verify the identities 
of those who read a particular will.64 Taking the court’s premise at face value, though, the 
harm associated with grave robbing will be internalized by each estate. A testator will 
come to understand that she can take it with her, but if she does so, she runs a higher risk 
that her grave will be targeted by grave robbers.65 One supposes that the types of people 
                                                 
62 Indeed, the law of at least one state recognizes the need to bury clothed cadavers. See N.D. Stat. Ann. 11-
19.1-15. Other cultures have had strong norms directing the burial or cremation of valuables along with 
their owner. GITTINGS, supra note 35, at 111; GRINSELL, supra note 35 , at 30-38, 50-53; Francis King 
Carey, The Disposition of the Body After Death, 19 AM. L. REV. 251, 254-61 (1885); Henry W. Ordower, 
Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL 
PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 313, 331 n.47 (1996) (“In early cultures, it was customary to inter 
considerable property, and sometimes live servants (and wives--an unfortunate custom that may continue in 
India today despite legal prohibitions), with the corpses of wealthy decedents to provide for the decedent in 
the next life. Most later cultures generally abandoned this practice, in part because it was economically 
inefficient. The practice deprived the society of the current use of the wealth after death and cultivated the 
grave robbing industry. On the positive side, burial finds provide archaeologists opportunities to study 
cultures for which no, or only a sparse, written record exists. With limited exceptions for specific items 
with particular sentimental value to the decedent, most decedents today do not attempt to take personal 
property with them, although courts occasionally abide by exceptional wishes of decedents, such as 
interment in an automobile.”) (citation omitted); Sykas, supra note 27, at 917-922 (discussing various 
ancient cultures’ practices of burying or cremating valuables along with the deceased). 
63 See, e.g., Ternant v. Boudreau, 6 Rob. (La. ) 488, 1844 WL 1761, at *2 (La. 1844) (involving a property 
dispute over a gold chain, a gold buckle, a pair of diamond earrings, two diamond rings, three golden rings, 
six small diamonds, and a diamond necklace that were recovered from criminals who had robbed Madame 
Ternant’s grave); State v. Lewis, 293 S.E.2d 638, 639 (N.C. App. 1982) (involving the removal of jewelry 
from graves); see also 13 VT. STAT. ANN. § 3761 (criminalizing the intentional removal of “an object 
interred or entombed with a human body”). See generally Julie Brienza, Advocates for Reform of Funeral, 
Cemetery Industry are Never at Rest, TRIAL 14, 14 (Nov. 1998) (noting the desecration of a Florida 
woman’s grave, revealing family heirlooms, a gold wedding band, and other jewelry). For a scholarly 
perspective on the prevalence of grave robbing in many cultures, see GRINSELL, supra note 35, at 101-109. 
64 At the risk of belaboring the obvious, in most instances, the only people who would have reason to 
examine a will would be those who knew or were related to the testator. If the county courthouse requires 
everyone to identify himself before gaining access to a will, then developing a list of suspects in any grave 
robbing investigation would not take much imagination on the part of the police. 
65 A savvy decedent may wish to have her jewelry destroyed or cremated along with her, thereby 
precluding the valuables from coming into the possession of the grave robber. See generally GRINSELL, 
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who want to be buried with valuable jewelry are precisely the types of people who would 
be most offended by the prospect of their graves being pillaged.66  
With the will disclosure law already on the books, permitting decedents to be 
buried with their properties would have, it seems, given will drafters and heirs all the 
right incentives. Indeed, it is hopefully not too grotesque to suggest that such a policy 
would give grave robbers the right incentives too, by preventing scattershot desecration. 
Efficient grave robbers would no longer target graves haphazardly, digging up graves that 
contain nothing of value.  
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 35, at 60-67 (discussing the prevalent custom of smashing of valuables deposited in the 
decedent’s grave); Carey, supra note 62, at 269-270-71 (hypothesizing that cremation eventually will 
become the norm, as a means of preventing grave robbers from stealing one’s corpse). 
66 Grave robbing also harms the deceased victim’s loved ones, as the Meksras court mentions. See also 
King v. Smith, 72 S.E.2d 425, 426 (N.C. 1952) (recognizing that the blood heirs of a deceased person 
whose grave is desecrated have a cause of action); Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388, 392 (W. Va. 
1989) (same). That said, on the above analysis, the interests of the decedent would seem to be well-aligned 
with the interests of the heirs, as people commonly recoil at the prospect of their own graves being robbed. 
Indeed, the heirs of a decedent evidently have the legal right to take action to prevent the desecration of 
their loved one’s graves, including the right to disinter the grave and re-take possession of buried valuables. 
On this point, see the remarkable case of Ternant v. Boudreau, 6 Rob. (La.) 488, 1844 WL 1761, at *3 
(La.): 
It is true, however, that the jewels which were put in the tomb of the defendant’s mother, 
were destined to remain there; and that although they never became a part of the 
monument, it may be fairly presumed if they had not tempted the covetousness of evil 
doers, they would never have been disturbed. They may have been placed there in 
compliance with the last wishes of the deceased . . . but although concealed in the bottom 
of a grave, and perhaps protected only by the respect which the living are naturally 
disposed to bear to the ashes of the dead, it cannot be denied, that they were corporeal 
things within the domain of ownership, and therefore subject to be taken possession of by 
the rightful owner, (the heir of the deceased,) and to be by him sold or alienated. If, 
however indecorous, and even infamous, the act might have been, the heir of the 
deceased had claimed those jewels, or taken them in possession, who could, under our 
laws, have disputed this right? The right of ownership belonged to him, and no one could 
have prevented him from exercising it in its fullest extent. 
6 Rob. (La. 488, 1844 WL 1761, at * 3 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In other words, jewels buried 
in a decedent’s grave belong to the heirs, and can be removed by the heirs at any time. English law is 
seemingly in accord regarding the ownership of such property. See M.R. RUSSELL DAVIES, THE LAW OF 
BURIAL, CREMATION AND EXHUMATION 29-30 (1982). 
 Had the Meksras court gone the other way, the best opportunity for the testator to take some of her 
wealth with her would be to will jewelry to a trusted relative, based on the unstated understanding that the 
property would be deposited (quietly) in the decedent’s casket before burial. In such instances, the relative 
is gaining the peace of mind associated with a diminished risk of grave-robbing at a cost of possible estate 
tax liability, and the decedent is running the risk that her wishes will not be honored if the designated 
jewelry has non-trivial value. 
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That is not to say that allowing people to be buried with their valuables engenders 
no third party harms. The court simply latched on to the wrong negative externalities. The 
primary inefficiency that would have resulted from a pro-destruction rule stems from 
increased expenditures on cemetery security, which would seem to be a dead-weight loss. 
There would also be substantial welfare losses associated with third parties’ revulsion at 
the thought that non-relatives’ graves might be robbed.   
 B. When Destruction Is Creation 
 The destruction of valuable property rarely fares well when viewed from 
an ex post perspective. Mrs. Johnston has built a house; it is a perfectly habitable house; 
destroying the house would be a terrible waste of scarce societal resources. Indeed, the 
Eyerman court seemed particularly resistant to allowing Johnston to destroy her home in 
light of the reductions in housing stock that St. Louis had witnessed during the 1960s.67 
What sense does it make for society to allow someone to remove a valuable, durable asset 
from the marketplace?  
And yet for nearly 100 years, American patent law has recognized the patentee’s 
right to do just that. In a fascinating 1908 opinion called Continental Paper Bag, the 
Supreme Court held that Eastern Paper Bag Company, the patentee of William Liddell’s 
improved technology for manufacturing paper bags, was entitled to suppress that Liddell 
patent during the full life of the patent term.68 Eastern neither developed the patented 
invention nor licensed the invention to competitors who wished to bring it to market.69 
                                                 
67 Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 214 (“We are constrained to take judicial notice of the pressing need of the 
community for dwelling units as demonstrated by recent U.S. Census Bureau figures showing a decrease of 
more than 14% in St. Louis City housing units during the decade of the 60’s. This decrease occurs in the 
face of housing growth in the remainder of the metropolitan area.”). Like many other cities, St. Louis saw 
its housing stock deteriorate in the less affluent parts of the city, not in affluent subdivisions like Kingsbury 
Place, so the Court’s argument seems to be a makeweight. 
68 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). The connection between 
the right to destroy real property and the right to retain patent rights without exploiting the invention was 
briefly noted in Valerian E. Greaves, The Social-Economic Purpose of Private Rights, 12 N.Y.U.L. Q. REV. 
439, 462 (1934-35). 
69 Id. at 427-28 (“The record also shows that the complainant, so to speak, locked up its patent. It has never 
attempted to make any practical use of it, either itself or through licenses, and, apparently, its proposed 
policy has been to avoid this. . . . We have no doubt that the complainant stands in the common class of 
manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting their general industries and 
shutting out competitors.”). 
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Instead, Eastern continued selling its inferior (previously patented) paper bag machines, 
which the company believed would be more profitable than the improved machines.70  
Continental Paper Bag Company sought to bring the Liddell invention to market 
and, in light of Eastern’s refusal to license the patent, did so. Predictably, Eastern sued 
for infringement and sought injunctive relief. Continental argued that while damages 
would be appropriate, no court of equity should issue an injunction to protect a patentee 
who intended to suppress the invention for the full patent term.71 Surely, Continental 
argued, it violated equitable principles to protect a monopolist’s profits at the cost of 
withholding from the public a valuable technological innovation.  
Eight Justices sided with Eastern. The Court used Blackstonian, formalist 
rhetoric, noting that an “inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his 
absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge of it from the public, and he may 
insist upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute promises to him who 
discloses to the public his invention.”72 Because property rights were absolute, the court 
reasoned, a patentee had an absolute right to exclude anyone who wanted to develop the 
invention. “[S]uch exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right 
conferred by patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, 
without question of motive.”73      
Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter. His two-sentence dissent noted that “the 
facts are such that the court should have declined, upon grounds of public policy, to give 
any relief to the plaintiff by injunction.”74 But Harlan evidently did not feel strongly 
enough to belabor the point. 
                                                 
70 Id. at 428 (“It was the purpose to make more money with the existing old reciprocating Lorenz & Honiss 
machines and the existing old complicated Stilwell machines than could be made with new Liddell 
machines, when the cost of building the latter was taken into account. And this purpose was effective to 
cause the long and invariable nonuse of the Liddell invention, notwithstanding that new Liddell machines 
might have produced better paper bags than the old Lorenz & Honiss machines or the old Stillwell 
machines were producing.”). 
71 Id. at 423. 
72 Id. at 424 (quoting United States v. American Bell Tele. Co., 167 US 249 (1897)). 
73 Id. at 429. 
74 Id. at 430 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Although the majority invoked the notion of absolute rights to exclude in 
affirming the lower court’s injunction against Continental, the case as the court 
understood it seems to implicate the right to destroy. At least on the facts presented to the 
Court, Eastern intended neither to bring the invention to market nor to allow anyone else 
to do so for the full term of the patent.75 On this account, the 17-year monopoly is granted 
and then essentially destroyed in its entirety. Consumers plainly are left holding the bag, 
as it were, having to make do with inferior products while the possibility of a superior 
product is cruelly dangled in front of them on the patent registry. Revealingly, Justice 
Harlan’s brief dissent suggests that he sees this turn of events in the same way that the 
Eyerman court would see Mrs. Johnston’s will decades later. The suppression of a 
valuable invention is a waste of a valuable economic resource that the public cannot 
                                                 
75 There is some reason to be skeptical of this claim. Surely there was some amount of money that 
Continental or another competitor could have paid Eastern to license the Liddell patent, but such a sum 
exceeded the anticipated profits that the competitor could have earned from sales of the improved machine. 
One further expects that toward the end of the term for its previous patents, Eastern would have brought the 
improved Liddell machines to market as a way of maintaining its dominant market share. It is not clear 
from the record how long the lapse was between the expiration date of the Liddell patent and the expiration 
dates of the earlier patents held by Eastern. Merges, Menell, and Lemley have a helpful discussion on the 
economics of patent suppression that help explain what Eastern might have been up to: 
In all these cases (and numerous others), patents for the allegedly suppressed products 
exist. What is uncertain is why the products were never commercialized. . . . If a new 
invention is truly superior to current products, [economists] argue, the patentee could sell 
that invention and more than make up for any losses it might sustain in the market for its 
current products. Indeed, economists continue, that is the definition of a superior product. 
This argument has substantial force when the allegedly suppressed invention is in the 
same market as the patentee’s current products. Thus panty hose manufacturers could 
presumably switch from selling disposable hose to selling no-run hose and, assuming the 
no-run hose was really a better product, charge prices high enough to make up for the fact 
that they would sell fewer pairs of hose. This argument is not completely convincing, 
however. If the process for producing no-run hose requires different machinery from that 
which the manufacturers currently use, there will be substantial fixed costs associated 
with the switch. Manufacturers may prefer to delay introducing the new product until 
they have to replace their machines anyway; they will suppress the invention until then. 
By contrast, if a new entrant into the market could use the patented process, he would 
choose to build the new machines immediately. By suppressing the patent, therefore, the 
patentee causes society to lose the benefits of the immediate production of the new 
process. 
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 290 (3rd ed. 2003) 
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tolerate.76 Ultimately, the majority’s view carried the day, as Congress codified part of 
the holding in Continental Paper Bag, so that a patentee’s failure to use or license an 
invention does not excuse third parties’ infringement.77    
Viewing the patent process ex post, the holding of Continental Paper Bag appears 
nonsensical. There is no good reason to grant someone a monopoly right to a valuable 
invention if he intends to use that right to suppress the invention. Conditioning the 
continuation of patent rights on the patentee’s reasonable use or licensing of the invention 
seems like a no brainer.78 As Justice Harlan’s dissent indicated, a court should, on public 
policy grounds, refuse to enjoin a third party’s infringement of a suppressed patent.79 
This hostility to patent suppression sounds in Lockean themes: If someone removes an 
idea from the public domain, he cannot waste it by prohibiting society from using it 
altogether.  
Viewed ex ante, however, a plausible justification for the result in Continental 
Paper Bag emerges. It might be the case that were companies like Eastern not permitted 
                                                 
76 Nearly four decades later, in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945), the Court re-affirmed 
its holding in Continental Paper Bag. This time, the vote was five-to-four, the majority’s opinion was less 
self-assured, and the dissent more vigorous. See generally id. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult 
to see how [the suppression] of patents can be reconciled with the purpose of the Constitution ‘to promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’ Can the suppression of patents which arrests the progress of 
technology be said to promote that progress? . . . Take the case of an invention or discovery which unlocks 
the doors of science and reveals the secrets of a dread disease. Is it possible that a patentee could be 
permitted to suppress that invention for seventeen years . . . and withhold from humanity the benefits of the 
cure?”).    
77 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (stating that the refusal to “license or use any rights to the patent” does not 
amount to patent misuse). 
78 Or perhaps not. In some instances, we might imagine a civic-minded organization purchasing patent 
rights in order to suppress an invention that, while demanded by some consumers, would generate 
substantial perceived negative externalities. Imagine the Sierra Club’s purchase of a patent on an 
automobile engine that would generate enormous horsepower and substantial pollution. More 
provocatively, reasonable people might disagree about whether the courts should resist the efforts of a 
group to acquire the patent to a morning-after pill such as RU-486 for the purposes of suppressing the drug. 
 In some sense, the suppression of a patented invention is less troublesome than the destruction of a 
durable economic resource like a house or a piece of jewelry. After all, a patent is necessarily time limited, 
and upon the expiration of the patent term, the invention will be resurrected, available to all as part of the 
public domain. That said, Eastern’s suppression of the Liddell invention seems much more troublesome 
than Johnston’s destruction of a solitary house. Patent suppression can prevent anyone from using not only 
the invention itself, but also all reasonable functional equivalents. Whereas Johnston’s home could be 
rebuilt following its destruction, albeit at a substantial cost, there is no corollary right to replace or 
substitute an invention that has been removed from the stream of commerce during the patent term. 
79 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
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to obtain blocking patents to protect their previous patents, they would not make the 
necessary investment of resources into inventing either the previous inventions or the 
blocking improvements. In other words, the availability of blocking patents may be a 
necessary part of the incentives that the patent system uses to encourage innovation in 
particular industries.80 When faced with the choice between (A) an inferior paper bag 
machine and a blocking patent on an improved machine; and (B) a substantial probability 
that neither machine will be invented, choice A seems acceptable.  
There is, of course, a real chance that this defense of Continental Paper Bag’s 
holding amounts to a just-so story more often than not, and there is a lot of empirical 
uncertainty here that should not be ignored. It may be the case that the possibility of 
licensing the earlier invention without the opportunity to suppress the second invention 
would have given Eastern enough incentive to invent the first. It may also be the case that 
other companies would have developed both the first and second inventions within a few 
months or years had Eastern never done so. In such cases, permitting Eastern to suppress 
the second invention for the full patent term seems a high price to pay for speedier 
introduction of the first invention. All we can say with certainty is that there will be some 
instances in which permitting the destruction of intellectual property helps create the right 
incentives for the creation of valuable intellectual property, and we will never know 
whether Continental Paper Bag was such a case. 
This raises the question of whether the right to destroy other kinds of property can 
be understood in a more favorable light if viewed ex ante. Put another way, even if we 
think that permitting the suppression of inventions rarely increases net innovation, are 
there classes of property for which permitting destruction probably does increase net 
creation? Society’s experience with the destruction of diaries and other personal papers 
will provide perhaps the strongest basis for a conclusive answer.  
                                                 
80 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989, 1013 (1997) (discussing the role that blocking patents might play in promoting the invention of 
improvements upon existing patented products). 
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The destruction of diaries and other papers is commonplace, even when those 
written works have enormous economic value. As Nixon v. United States,81 makes clear, 
American Presidents have repeatedly destroyed diaries, correspondence, and other 
personal effects, either during their lifetimes or via will. Throughout the nation’s history 
a strong custom existed giving the President ownership of his presidential papers.82 
Private ownership of these papers evidently entailed a right to destroy them. According to 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, there are “numerous examples of Presidents willfully and 
intentionally destroying their presidential papers.”83 These Presidents include Van Buren, 
Garfield, Arthur, Grant, Pierce, and Coolidge.84 President Harding and Fillmore’s heirs 
also destroyed large numbers of presidential papers following the deaths of those 
Presidents.85 Some of Abraham Lincoln’s papers were destroyed by his heirs as well.86 
The destruction of these papers occurred even though the Library of Congress repeatedly 
approached Presidents and their heirs, offering “fancy sums” to purchase collections of 
presidential papers.87 Presidents and presidential descendants well understood the 
economic and historical value of their official papers, and nevertheless set them ablaze. 
Numerous Supreme Court justices behaved likewise.88 These Presidents and other public 
officials were not behaving irrationally. Rather, they were destroying the papers to 
protect their privacy and the privacy of their associates.89  
                                                 
81 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Years after the D.C. Circuit’s remand, I worked on this case for the 
Nixon estate, researching issues relating to just compensation for his presidential papers. 
82 Id. at 1282. 
83 Id. at 1279. 
84 Id. at 1279-80. 
85 President Fillmore willed his presidential papers to his son, and the son’s will directed that all the 
presidential papers be destroyed. Id. at 1291. President Harding’s widow destroyed many of his papers 
following Harding’s death. Id. at 1294. 
86 Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and 
Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential Papers, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 
660 (2003). 
87 Id. at 1282-83. 
88 SAX, supra note 7, at 94-95. 
89 Turley, supra note 86, at 731 (“Still others view the value of ownership as the right to destroy papers to 
preserve a legacy.”); cf. id. at 718 (“Presidents and their heirs could clearly have sold these documents for 
some profit, rather than destroy them. No rational actor would destroy an item of value that could be sold at 
a profit, except if the presence of ‘tastes’ or soft variables supplied a different type of benefit in destruction. 
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The case of President Garfield is particularly striking. Garfield was shot by an 
assassin on July 2, 1881, and was ailing until his death on September 19, 1881.90 During 
that time, as it became increasingly clear that his life was in danger, Garfield began 
frantically destroying large portions of his personal and political files.91 After Garfield’s 
death, his children donated the remaining papers to the Library of Congress.92    
Largely in response to the fallout from Watergate and the Nixon papers dispute, 
Congress enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978,93 prospectively abolishing 
private ownership of presidential papers.94 The Act makes it quite difficult for the 
President to destroy any of the presidential papers that are produced during his tenure. 
The President may not dispose of any records that have “administrative, historical, 
informational, or evidentiary value,”95 a category that presumably includes virtually all 
presidential records.96 If the President does wish to destroy a presidential record that 
lacks administrative, historical, informational, and evidentiary value, he may petition the 
Archivist of the United States for permission to do so. If the Archivist further concludes 
that said records are of no “special interest to the Congress” and that “consultation with 
the Congress regarding the disposal of these particular records is [not] in the public 
interest,” then he may provide the President with written authorization to destroy the 
                                                                                                                                                 
These tastes are often highly personal and directly at odds with the public value of the documents. For 
Nixon, the destruction of incriminating material was of tremendous personal value. In fact, the personal 
value in the destruction of the records to Nixon was directly proportional to the public’s value in 
preservation, due to a shared view of the importance of the records in evaluating his presidency.”). 
90 979 F.2d at 1293.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 44 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. 
94 44 U.S.C. § 2202. 
95 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c). 
96 “Personal records,” which are documents that do not concern the President’s official duties, are excluded 
from the Act, and can be destroyed by the President. Turley, supra note 86, at 667 & n.89.  
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records in question.97 Only upon receiving the Archivist’s written authorization may the 
President or his staff destroy a particular record.98 
One strongly suspects that given a President’s inability to destroy important 
papers, and given the hassle associated with destroying even the most insignificant scrap 
of presidential parchment, a rational President whose rights are restricted by the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978 will create a much less interesting paper trail than his 
less constrained predecessors. When in doubt, the President will simply neglect to 
memorialize an important idea or communication.99 Indeed, in discussing the right to 
destroy presidential papers, President Taft noted that the historically interesting 
documents are the ones least likely to be preserved by their creators: 
It is a little like what Mr. Charles Francis Adams told me of the diplomatic 
records of the British Foreign Office. It has long been the custom for the 
important Ambassadors of Great Britain to carry on a personal 
correspondence with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which is 
not put in the files of the department, but which gives a much more 
accurate and detailed account of the diplomatic relations of Great Britain 
than the official files. The only way in which historians can get at this, is 
through the good offices of the families of the deceased Ambassadors and 
Foreign Secretaries in whose private files they may be preserved.100 
If a President anticipates being able to decide at a later date whether to destroy an 
embarrassing, revealing, or controversial document, then he will be more likely to create 
                                                 
97 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) & § 2203(e)(1)-(2). 
98 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c). As Jonathan Turley points out, Executive Order 13,233, issued by President George 
W. Bush, strengthens the hand of the President, visa vi the Archivist, if the President wishes to restrict 
access to certain papers. Turley, supra note 86, at 672-76. Notably, the Executive Order does not restore 
the President’s traditional power to destroy presidential papers. Id. at 687. 
99 The Act does provide that “the President shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the 
activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of his constitutional, statutory, 
or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented.” 44 U.S.C. § 2203(a). It is difficult to 
imagine a less enforceable provision in the United States Code. 
100 Id. at 1280 (quoting W.H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 34 (1916)). 
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and save it in the first place.101 Historians writing in the future hopefully will be able to 
evaluate whether the 1978 Act’s anti-destruction rule caused post-Carter Presidents to 
leave behind less revealing paper collections than previous executives did.102   
While perhaps best illustrated in the context of the right to destroy personal 
papers, the ex ante perspective illuminates a number of other areas in which incentives 
for the creation of valuable property might depend on the presence of a robust right to 
destroy. Historic preservation of buildings presents one such case. Historic preservation 
statutes typically limit the rights of landowners whose buildings have been designated 
landmarks to demolish those buildings.103  
Where someone tries to destroy his own property, and courts have a chance to 
prevent the destruction, there is a danger that loss aversion will steer judges in the wrong 
                                                 
101 Joseph Sax recognizes this point, and then dismisses its importance. SAX, supra note 7, at 86 
(“Undoubtedly the prospect of public access discourage putting very candid, politically sensitive material 
down on paper, though the exigencies of the job impose limits on the ability of officials to refrain from 
making a paper or electronic record. According to Stephen Hess, a White House staff member for both 
President Eisenhower and President Nixon, most presidential advisers do not have unlimited access to the 
president and so must commit their views and advice in writing to get it before him. In addition advisers 
write memoranda to protect themselves by assuring that their positions are accurately memorialized. 
Former presidential advisers as well as former cabinet officials who testified before a National Study 
Commission set up to examine the status of presidential papers agreed that so long as confidentiality could 
be protected for a reasonable time, disincentives to creation of written records would be effectively 
eliminated.”). This analysis, of course, does not apply to presidential papers created by the President 
himself. A President’s concern about the judgment of historians, combined with the certainty of historians’ 
scrutiny, may well prevent him from memorializing revealing notes about their thoughts and motivations.   
 With respect to lower-level executive branch officials, one imagines that those who hope for plum 
postings in the future will disagree with Hess’s take, particularly if they have written about matters on 
which popular opinion has shifted in the intervening years. Analogously, the White House and Justice 
Department categorically refused to turn over to the Senate Judiciary Committee memoranda that Miguel 
Estrada had written while working for the Solicitor General’s Office between 1992 and 1997. Helen Dewar, 
Deadlock over Estrada Deepens; White House Rejects Democrats’ Requests for Nominee’s Memos, WASH. 
POST, Feb 13, 2003, at A4; Charles Lane, Lawmakers Press Nominee; Democrats Seek Memos, Challenge 
Estrada’s Credibility, WASH. POST., Sep. 27, 2003, at A5. The failure to turn over the memoranda left 
Democratic Senators suspicious about Estrada’s views and ultimately resulted in a filibuster and Estrada’s 
failure to gain confirmation for a seat on the D.C. Circuit. 
102 The Act has applied to all Presidents since Ronald Reagan. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1296-97.  
103 See, e.g., Kalorama Heights Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 655 A.2d 865, 869 (D.C. 1995); see 
also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 954 
(1985) (noting that the New York City landmarks law “only rarely allows demolition” of historic 
buildings). 
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direction.104 This is particularly true in cases involving homes and other buildings. Judges 
may grow fond of long-existing buildings or defer to people who love buildings that have 
long been part of a neighborhood landscape. Judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens 
have a much more difficult time imagining the structures that will replace these venerable 
buildings, even though virtually every landmark building in a major city stands on a site 
that was previously occupied by some other structure.105  
 For much of the nation’s history, the judiciary’s Blackstonian, absolutist notions 
of ownership trumped these tendencies to preserve the old regardless of the cost to the 
new. So, when it considered the Ramsey case in 1960, the Illinois Supreme Court found it 
quite natural to hold that a building owner was entitled to a demolition permit where the 
costs of repairing and maintaining a historically significant building was quite high, and 
where the owner would still lose money operating the building if it were fully renovated 
at the public’s expense.106 The property would invariably lose money for its owner, so the 
                                                 
104 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central 
City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 500 (1998) (“The endowment effect suggests that an 
existing building is more valuable than one not yet built.”). For a brief synopsis of the loss aversion 
phenomenon, see REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 308-10 
(2000). 
105 Perhaps no city illustrates the creative possibilities of destruction better than Rotterdam, in the 
Netherlands. In 1940, the German Luftwaffe leveled the entire city center. H.W. Koch, The Strategic Air 
Offensive Against Germany: The Early Phase, May-September 1940, 34 HIST. J. 117, 129 (1991). 
Following the war, city planners saw the destruction of the historic center as an opportunity to build a new 
kind of ultra-modern European city. They succeeded. See, e.g., Joan Ockman, Urban Rebirth: Cities 
Coping with Disaster Offer Lessons for Rebuilding New York’s World Trade Center Site, ARCHITECTURE, 
Sep. 1, 2002, at 41; Rodney Bolt, The City Doesn’t Give a Damn: Rotterdam Is Big and Brash and, Unlike 
Its Dutch Rivals, Has Lots of Attitude, SUNDAY TEL., April 1, 2001, at 4. The enormous scale of the 
destruction provided an opportunity to rethink, and improve upon, the urban environment. Of course, other 
cities facing similar circumstances have done less with the opportunity than Rotterdam. See Ockman, supra 
at __ (discussing the botched post-war reconstruction of Plymouth, England).  
No reasonable person would deny the harm that is done when buildings with great historic or 
architectural value are demolished or destroyed. See generally CARLA LIND, LOST WRIGHT: FRANK LLOYD 
WRIGHT’S VANISHED MASTERPIECES 10 (1996) (noting that 118 of the approximately 500 buildings 
designed by Frank Lloyd Wright no longer exist). The point of this paper, however, is to suggest that the 
overprotection of existing buildings will result in some future buildings never getting built. As society 
becomes increasingly hostile to the right to destroy, there is a strong possibility that the pendulum will 
swing too far toward overprotection of extant structures.  
106 People ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 171 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ill. Ct. App. 1960). This rule in some 
ways anticipates the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which held that a 
per se taking occurred where a government regulation deprived a landowner of the entire value of his 
property. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). The landowner in Ramsey was arguing that if he was forced to 
maintain the current structure on his property, he could not make any money off it – meaning that the 
preservation regulation essentially reduced the land’s value to zero.   
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court held that the owner had a common law right to tear it down. Implicit in this holding 
is the sensible view that destroying a building in order to maximize the value of the land 
on which it sits is not property destruction at all—rather it is an improvement to the 
parcel as a whole.   
Three decades later, the Blackstonian notion of absolute ownership had receded to 
the point where courts ratified ill-considered policies that forced land owners to expend 
large sums maintaining teetering buildings. In one such case, J.C. & Associates, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied a property owner’s request to destroy a 
fire-damaged building that, in the opinion of several experts and a city building inspector, 
was on the brink of collapse.107 The building had been designated a historic landmark 
before the fire, but the fire had rendered it an eyesore and the costs of rehabilitating it 
appeared prohibitive.  
Some have argued that the possibility of future landmark designation and the 
associated limitations on future uses will discourage property owners from 
commissioning great buildings.108 I agree with William Fischel that this precise 
possibility is a “bit far-fetched.”109 Under existing laws, the time lag between a building’s 
groundbreaking and its designation as a historic landmark is long enough that any 
concerns about future landmarking will be discounted by most developers. That said, 
there will be instances in which the decisions a building owner makes after the 
completion of construction affect the building’s chances of being designated a historic 
landmark. For example, the owner of a building that has some historic or architectural 
                                                 
107 J.C. & Assoc v. District of Columbia Bd. of App. & Rev., 778 A.2d 296, 308-09 (D.C. 2001). The City 
presented evidence to suggest that the building was salvageable.  
108 See, e.g., Mendes Hershman, Critical Issues in Historic Preservation, 12 URB. LAWYER 19, 28 (1980) 
(“One untoward and unfortunate consequence of the Penn Central decision may be the discouragement of 
distinguished architecture, of design which represents an outstanding illustration of a certain architectural 
style or period because of the developer’s fear of thereby freezing the building against future demolition, 
alteration, or redevelopment.”). 
109 William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preservation, and Rent Control, 6 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 749, 754 (1995) (“There is one other thing that might discipline landmarks 
preservation laws in the long run. It is the possibility that because sometime in the future a building might 
be designated a landmark or otherwise subjected to uncompensated regulation, landlords will begin hiring 
mediocre architects or asking good architects to design mediocre buildings that will not be landmarked. 
Now, this idea struck me as a little bit far-fetched.”). 
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merit but that will not become eligible for landmark designation for ten more years might 
maintain the exterior of the building poorly or remove the most architecturally interesting 
ornamentation in the years preceding landmark eligibility.110 These acts or omissions may 
substantially reduce the likelihood of potentially costly government regulation in the not-
too-distant future.  
 Those who wish to limit the right to destroy further, however, propose to 
eliminate the time lag that currently causes developers to discount the possibility of 
future landmark designation when designing a new building. Joseph Sax argues that we 
“already have well-established systems for classifying and protecting historic structures, 
and it would be a rather small step to create a new category that designates distinguished, 
newer architectural masterworks, and offers them some protection.”111 Sax then suggests 
that governments could adopt a range of regulatory options to protect new architectural 
triumphs.112    
Sax’s proposal is no “small step.” Restricting the alteration or destruction of new 
buildings could have enormously deleterious consequences with respect to developers’ 
incentives to commission great architectural works. Such a developer would be locking-
in a particular parcel to continue its current use perpetually, without regard to changes in 
market conditions or social tastes. The developer would also need to invest substantial 
resources in ensuring that the architect selected the appropriate designs and building 
materials, because the local government could deter or even preclude functional or 
aesthetic changes at a later date.113 Contemporaneous limitations on the destruction or 
                                                 
110 POSNER, supra note 132, at 67 (“There is, however, a danger of reducing the supply of landmarks under 
the designation approach; building owners may rush to demolish potential landmark facades in advance of 
designation.”). Dean Lueck and Jeffrey A. Michael support a similar claim with respect to endangered 
species habitats. Their study of forest land in North Carolina revealed that landowners harvest timber 
prematurely if their land is proximate to red-cockaded woodpecker habitat as a means of preventing the 
woodpeckers from establishing habitats on their land. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive 
Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, Working Paper April 2000, at 30. On their 
account, the Endangered Species Act’s substantial restrictions on landowners’ use of land containing the 
habitat of endangered species encourage landowners to destroy habitat that might be suitable for 
endangered species but is not yet populated by them.  
111 SAX, supra note 7, at 199 (emphasis added). 
112 Id.  
113 During the 1980s, several new skyscrapers clad in Carrarra marble had to be resurfaced because the 
marble unexpectedly failed in cold-weather conditions, and had the potential to fall off the buildings. 
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modification of buildings also denies landmark commissions the hindsight and 
perspective that can be so useful in evaluating a building’s merits. Simply put, the 
destruction or modification of a new building is usually supported by compelling 
circumstances. The prospect of immediate limitations on the right to destroy would 
almost certainly do more harm than good and substantially dampen builders’ incentives 
to commission great works.114 
Whatever the economic consequences of immediate landmarking, Sax sees a 
moral basis for imposing such requirements on the owners of new buildings: 
[W]hile the patrons (or owners) of an important work of architecture were 
not obliged to engage with a masterwork, having done so they have by 
their own voluntary act potentially made the community worse off than it 
would have been if they had never acted. It is insufficient to say that the 
work would not have existed without their patronage. For they have 
diverted the time and effort of an artist from other work he might have 
done, and that—in other hands—might have been better protected.115 
Thus, Sax says, the patron who decides to destroy a great building has wasted the 
architect’s time and prevented him from doing other great works that would be preserved 
for generations. 
 Sax’s argument is ultimately unconvincing. Great architects have strong economic 
and artistic motivations for seeing that their better works are preserved for future 
                                                                                                                                                 
Michael Arndt, Amoco Tower’s Fate May Be Carved in Stone, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1988, at 4. Most 
famously, Chicago’s 1,136 foot Amoco (now Aon) Tower had its marble replaced with granite 17 years 
after its construction, at a cost of $60 to $80 million. Lindsey Tanner, Amoco Caught Between Rock, Hard 
Place, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1990, at E16. Initial estimates suggested that the cost of replacing the marble 
would equal the costs of building the skyscraper in the first place. Arndt, supra, at 4. 
114 There is a way in which Sax’s proposal might be improved. The law could permit a developer to opt-out 
of subsequent landmark designation by paying a fee to the city government during the construction process. 
By paying such a fee, the developer would obtain a long-term, or even perpetual, transferable right to 
modify or demolish her structure. A carefully calibrated fee structure could diminish the incentive to avoid 
building grand structures by giving developers on the margins a more palatable alternative option. Such a 
regime is similar in many ways to the Visual Artists’ Rights Act’s waiver provision, whereby artists who 
do not particularly care whether their works are destroyed can reap higher payments from patrons in 
exchange for waiving their rights to prevent destruction. See infra text accompanying note 183.  
115 Id. at 58. 
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generations. Architects are thus good agents for the public. But there are other things, 
besides preservation, that great architects are trying to maximize when negotiating 
projects with clients. Architects typically want clients who can offer substantial 
resources, high-profile building sites, favorable zoning environments, hands-off 
supervision, and many other perks. Renowned architects will select their projects based 
on a combination of all these factors, and there will be difficult tradeoffs among them. It 
therefore seems strange to impose preservation requirements on clients, without 
simultaneously mandating that clients fully fund architects’ visions (and happily pay for 
unanticipated overruns), provide large building sites that maximize architects’ flexibility, 
generously pay off neighbors and zoning board officials to ensure that their objections do 
not limit the architect’s freedom of action, and so on. Indeed, because preservation 
covenants will be at least somewhat costly to architecture clients, we can expect that 
forced preservation will leave clients with fewer resources to spend on building materials, 
zoning variances, extra land, and all the other factors that might make a building worth 
preserving.  
Requiring the preservation of great buildings may ensure that some beautiful and 
potentially influential designs never get built.  The 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian 
Exposition provides perhaps the most famous example of an architect trading off 
permanence for other project attributes. The gifted architect Daniel Burnham oversaw the 
construction of glorious white buildings made of plaster of Paris and hemp fibers. The 
buildings were temporary structures, but they proved profoundly influential, helping to 
usher in a neoclassical revolution age of architecture, and providing a blueprint for the 
great Chicago civic structures that would be built during the decades that followed.116 
Had Burnham’s “Great White City” been built of anything sturdier, it would have never 
been built as large, as quickly, as cheaply, or as magnificently. Permanence is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for great architecture. There is a place on our 
landscape for gorgeous sandcastles. 
                                                 
116 DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC OF CHICAGO AND THE MARKING OF AMERICA 
380-85 (1996). 
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There can be, in short, a strong connection between property destruction and 
creation. When individuals and businesses destroy valuable properties, they often do so 
for rational reasons. Denying owners the right to destroy properties that become 
embarrassing, unfashionable, unproductive, or obsolete threatens the impulses that will 
spur future creation.  
C. Our Distaste for Waste: An Assessment 
 To the extent that society has curtailed the property owner’s common law right to 
destroy that which is his, waste avoidance has been the primary basis for doing so. In 
principal, there is nothing wrong with this. Setting aside ex ante considerations, social 
welfare is generally diminished when valuable resources are obliterated. As a proxy for 
social welfare, courts have looked primarily to the presumed motives of the destroyer—
Where they believe that the destroyer is acting because of anti-social motivations, they 
prohibit destruction, and where they believe that the destroyer is acting out of pro-social 
motivations, they permit it.   
Surveying the instances in which courts have used this proxy to limit the 
individual’s right to destroy property, however, diminishes one’s confidence that courts 
can either discern motives accurately or separate those cases in which destruction is 
wasteful from those in which destruction may benefit society. In the home destruction 
cases, the courts seemed oblivious to the positive externalities that might be associated 
with the creation of open space or woodlands.117 And as preferences changed over time, 
with respect to historical preservation, for example, the social meaning of destruction was 
flipped on its head.118 Furthermore, as some of these cases suggest, courts limited the 
right to destroy on the basis of overstated negative externalities.119  
In other instances, anti-waste sentiment is so persuasive that it obscures the social 
waste that results from excessive preservation or insufficient creation. Urban real estate is 
a scarce commodity, and the city that places too many of its structures off limits to 
                                                 
117 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 57-66. 
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modern architects risks economic and aesthetic stagnation. Limiting the right to destroy 
based on waste and other negative externalities may be reasonable in theory, but a review 
of the published cases suggests the courts have trouble applying this defensible rule.   
III. Disfavored Treatment for Testamentary Destruction 
 Several of the cases discussed in the previous section involve testamentary 
destruction, a topic that, by itself, deserves sustained attention. Whatever one thinks 
about the right of a living person to destroy her property, it is harder, instinctively, to 
develop sympathy for the owner who wishes to destroy her property via will. 
Policymakers ordinarily do not consider the dead as having a utility function, except 
insofar as individuals are worried about what happens to them after they die and will take 
actions during life to safeguard their graves, legacies, or descendants’ welfare. Yet most 
of the litigated right-to-destroy cases arise in the probate context, and the law generally 
gives the living owner much greater power to destroy property than the dead owner.120  
 A legal rule that empowers living destroyers and disempowers testamentary 
destroyers can be circumvented quite easily. Clever estate attorneys could satisfy a 
testator’s destructive wishes by creating SmashCorp., a firm whose business model 
would consist of destroying any property it receives in exchange for a small fee. The 
testator could then devise all to-be-destroyed properties to SmashCorp., secure in the 
knowledge that her wishes would be carried out by the company’s demolition experts. 
The ease of circumventing the prevailing rule raises questions about the reasons for its 
persistence. Even setting aside these pragmatic concerns about circumvention, however, 
the law’s reluctance to permit testamentary destruction is worth re-thinking. A regime 
that gives dead people no power to destroy their property will influence, perhaps for the 
worse, living souls who are contemplating their own demise. 
 
                                                 
120 See infra note 122. There are isolated exceptions. For example, while a testator can direct the destruction 
of his heart via will, a living testator cannot lawfully destroy his own heart. 
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A. Why a Testator Has a Stake in Destroyed Property 
There is one justification for restricting the rights of people to destroy their 
property via will that emerges repeatedly in the literature and case law. Dukeminier and 
Johanson’s leading casebook on trusts and estates set forth the argument: 
The law gives a living person much more power over his property than it 
gives a dead person. . . . . [D]uring life a person personally suffers the 
economic consequences, which is a deterrent to foolish decisions ordering 
property destroyed. If a person destroys his property during life, the 
person usually assumes this act will make him better off. And society 
assumes that the totality of individual choice of this kind will maximize 
society’s wealth. Ordering property destroyed after death imposes no 
economic consequences upon the testator, who is dead; the testator’s 
decision, which is not effective until death, does not (and cannot) take into 
account pecuniary loss suffered by the decision-maker. The inhibiting 
effect of immediate economic loss does not affect a direction in a will to 
destroy property. Hence a court will ordinarily order property destroyed 
only if there is a convincing justification.121 
On this account, we only defer to the person who is willing to put his money where his 
mouth is by destroying property while he might otherwise live to enjoy it. Courts 
deciding right-to-destroy cases such as Eyerman and Pace have adopted reasoning 
substantially similar to Dukeminier & Johanson.122 
                                                 
121 JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 22-23 (3d ed. 1984) 
(emphasis added). The most recent version of Dukeminier & Johanson’s book articulates essentially the 
same view, albeit in a toned down form. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND ESTATES 33 (6th ed. 2000) (hereinafter DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON 6TH) (“A person can, if she wishes, 
destroy her property during life (unless it is subject to historic preservation or similar laws), but she suffers 
the economic consequences of her decision, plus or minus. Should a testator be permitted to order the 
destruction of property at death when the economic loss is not visited upon the testator but on others? 
Consider . . . Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (‘a well-ordered 
society cannot tolerate’ waste.)”). 
122 Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 215 (“While living, a person may manage, use or dispose of his money or 
property with fewer restraints than a decedent by will. One is generally restrained from wasteful 
expenditure or destructive inclinations by the natural desire to enjoy his property or to accumulate it during 
his lifetime. Such considerations however have not tempered the extravagance or eccentricity of the 
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 Dukeminier and Johanson’s explanation is incorrect. I will use the facts of the 
Eyerman case to explain why. Recall that Eyerman involved Mrs. Johnston’s will 
provision directing that her house be razed. Dukeminier and Johanson are obviously 
correct that upon her death, she had no incentive to preserve the house. But Mrs. Johnston 
did not draft her will on her deathbed. On some earlier date, when she did create her will, 
Mrs. Johnston knew she wanted to spend the remainder of her life living in her home. She 
faced a choice about what to do with the remainder interest in her home. If she had 
wanted, she could have retained a life estate in her home and sold the remainder interest 
to a third party for a substantial sum of money.123 She then could have used that money 
immediately to improve the quality of her life. If she wished to destroy the home, by 
contrast, she would have to forego this present income from the sale of the remainder. So 
by foregoing a substantial amount of current income and retaining fee simple ownership 
over her home, Mrs. Johnston did put her money where her mouth was.  
The closer Mrs. Johnston got to death, the higher the value of the remainder 
interest she was foregoing, so the greater her current monetary sacrifice became. As a 
property owner’s life expectancy diminishes, the sacrifice associated with the 
posthumous destruction of her property more closely approximates the sacrifice made by 
a property owner who is alive. Under this reasoning, Dukeminier and Johanson’s broad 
claim is false, and the difference between the living and dead destroyer entails a mere 
matter of degree. The first destroys 100% of his asset, and the second destroys, if elderly, 
perhaps 75% of his asset. Both the living destroyer and the testamentary destroyer incur 
costs as soon as they decide to destroy the property. 
There will be situations during which a property owner has little use for additional 
wealth. A dying property owner might liquidate future interests in order to pay for 
expensive medical intervention, a private hospital room, travel costs for old friends and 
relatives who wish to visit her one last time, and the like. But some wealthy individuals 
have more than enough money to cover even the most lavish end-of-life expenditures. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
testamentary disposition here on which there is no check except the courts.”); In re Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 
488, 492 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1977) (quoting this language from Eyerman with approval). 
123 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (giving valuations for life estates, based on life expectancy of life tenant 
and applicable interest rate). 
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such cases, where the additional income to be gained from a sale of future interests in 
one’s property is essentially superfluous, there would be a stronger case for limiting the 
owner’s power to destroy that which is hers, particularly where the owner only announces 
her destructive intentions towards the end of her life. If, however, the decision to destroy 
property was made by an owner who faced ordinary resource constraints or who was not 
anticipating her imminent demise, the case for deferring to those wishes is strong. 
More serious problems arise if individuals destroy property either because they do 
not recognize the potential to obtain immediate income in exchange for the sale of a 
future interest or because they underestimate the value of a remainder interest in their 
property. Destruction in either case might well make society worse off. In the former 
case, the owner would be failing to realize that sparing the property might benefit both 
herself and society in general. In the latter case, an owner might falsely believe 
destruction to be the property’s highest value use. There is a neat solution to these 
interesting problems created by unsophisticated owners, and it will be discussed in 
Section D.  
B. State Action and Transaction Costs 
Courts have sometimes suggested that the law’s disfavored treatment of 
testamentary destruction is appropriate because of the state’s role in the probate process. 
A living owner’s destruction of his own property usually entails no state action or 
involvement, whereas the destruction of property via will often does. Allowing the 
destruction of property via will therefore arguably makes the state a partner of the 
wasteful decedent.124 Hence, a court might hold that the difference between inter vivos 
destruction and testamentary destruction is that the state is only involved in the latter, and 
                                                 
124 See generally Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 214-15 (“[T]he taking of property by inheritance or will is not an 
absolute or natural right but one created by the laws of the sovereign power. . . [T]he state 'may foreclose 
the right absolutely, or it may grant the right upon conditions precedent, which conditions, if not otherwise 
violative of our Constitution, will have to be complied with before the right of descent and distribution 
(whether under the law or by will) can exist. Further, this power of the state is one of inherent sovereignty 
which allows the state to ‘say what becomes of the property of a person, when death forecloses his right to 
control it.’”); Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (“To violate public policy the act in question need not be 
something which the testator could not have done with his own land while he was alive. . . . After his death 
. . . it is against public policy to permit the decedent to confer this power upon someone else where his 
purpose is merely capricious.”). 
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the sovereign can use this involvement as an appropriate basis for asserting an anti-waste 
public policy interest. 
Upon reflection, the state action argument seems to be little more than a 
makeweight. The notion that restrictions on destruction are appropriate where state action 
is implicated merely begs the question of when the state should get involved in a property 
owner’s decision to destroy. The state does get involved whenever someone tries to 
destroy a building (via the demolition permit process), domestic currency (via criminal 
law),125 and in most instances where an important work of visual art by a living artist is to 
be destroyed (via the Visual Artist’s Rights Act126). It does not get involved in the 
destruction of jewelry, most foreign currency, or important artwork by Great Masters. 
The conceptual bases for these distinctions are not obvious, and so it seems questionable 
to hang one’s hat on a state action theory.127  
Another implication of the state action argument is that the state ought to become 
much more vigilant in protecting against resource destruction than it currently is. For 
example, on a state action rationale, when two litigants both claim ownership of a 
particular resource, the courts ought to make the claimants’ intended uses of the resource 
an important factor in the decision calculus. If Pierson wants to destroy the fox and Post 
wants to donate it to the local natural history museum for display, then the state’s interest 
in avoiding complicity in destruction ought to make the court more likely to award 
custody of the fox to Post.128 Similarly, the government’s property and gift taxation rules 
may affect owners’ incentives to destroy property, and so it would seem that the state 
ought to maintain tax policies that penalize destroyers of property. But in fact tax rules 
often do not penalize destruction.129  
                                                 
125 See 18 USC §§ 331 & 333 (criminalizing the mutilation of U.S. coins and paper money).  
126 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  
127 Indeed, the probate process itself might be dealt with effectively through private contracts and dispute 
resolution. 
128 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805). 
129 See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. , 839 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1988) (“If you own the Mona Lisa and paint 
(indelibly) a mustache on it before giving the painting to your child, with the result that its value is greatly 
reduced, still your gift tax will be computed at the reduced value.”); Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 
674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]f a public figure ordered his executor to shred and burn his papers, 
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 There is a related, far more persuasive, basis for distinguishing between 
destruction by an owner and destruction by an executor. On this account, the state has 
some interest in preventing the waste of valuable, privately-owned resources, but faces 
monitoring and enforcement costs every time it seeks to do so. Because the probate 
process already involves lawyers and the judicial system, and because monitoring 
probated wills to find instances of property destruction is relatively inexpensive, the state 
can prevent inefficient destruction without expending substantial resources. The same 
may be true for the destruction of buildings by living owners, because such destruction is 
ordinarily noticeable by neighbors and/or city inspectors. Monitoring living owners’ 
surreptitious destruction of artworks, on the other hand, would be quite costly, and the 
costs of monitoring and enforcing anti-destruction rules would exceed the cost of 
allowing some private destruction.  
That said, if transaction costs minimization is the appropriate rationale for the 
law’s restrictions on property destruction, then the law needs to be adjusted in several 
respects. For example, the government is involved in the regulation of funeral homes, and 
might require licensed funeral home directors to guarantee that wedding rings and other 
valuable jewelry not be buried in graves. But evidently, Meksras’s common law anti-
destruction rule is not enforced via funeral home regulations.130 Moreover, in those 
instances where a living person publicly announces an intent to destroy a particular piece 
of property,131 the government’s monitoring costs approach zero, and the enforcement 
costs might be relatively low. In all these situations, the government’s failure to intervene 
to prevent waste can be second guessed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and then to turn the ashes over to a newspaper, then the value to be counted would be the value of the 
ashes, rather than the papers.”); Holland v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 422 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (assuming that 
taxpayers are allowed a deduction against ordinary income for a loss resulting from a building demolition). 
But see infra note 193 (noting that the IRS has adopted a contrary rule in at least one instance). 
130 See, e.g., Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 453 et seq. (1999); supra note 2. 
131 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 3 and infra note 203. 
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C. Publicity and Social Norms 
 In explaining the law’s hostility toward will provisions directing the destruction 
of property, scholars have noted the potential for people affected by destruction to 
persuade the living owner to reconsider. Adam Hirsch makes the argument succinctly: 
Living persons face the . . . social repercussions of their actions; dead 
persons do not. One consequence is that a testator can, if she is so 
inclined, wash her hands of her dependents, without suffering the 
opprobrium that a living person would bear for such behavior. Death 
spares the testator from interpersonal costs.132 
Hirsch thus argues that a testamentary destroyer avoids having to witness the 
consequences of her actions on her heirs, and immunizes herself against the social 
retaliation that might follow.  
 Judge Posner offers a related explanation for courts’ hostility to testamentary 
destruction. If the destroyer is still alive at the time of the destructive act, then affected 
neighbors or kin might be able to persuade her to alter her course. The person who 
destroys her property via will, on the other hand, is no longer susceptible to such 
persuasion.133 The testamentary destroyer can keep his intentions secret, thereby 
precluding third parties from trying to persuade him to preserve his property. Courts 
construing destructive wills have been troubled by the prospect that the testator might 
have changed his mind if only he had known certain facts not available at the time.134 
Indeed, the law’s suspicious treatment of testamentary disposition is not limited to the 
                                                 
132 Hirsch, supra note 27, at 72-73. 
133 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 558-59 (5th ed. 1998) (“Consider, however, the 
possibilities for modification that would exist if the gift were inter vivos rather than testamentary. As the 
deadline approached, the son might come to his father and persuade him that a diligent search had revealed 
no marriageable Jewish girl who would accept him. The father might be persuaded to grant an extension or 
otherwise relax the condition . . . The point just made may also explain why, although the owner of an art 
collection is perfectly free to destroy it during his lifetime, . . . a court might consider a condition in his will 
ordering its destruction to be unreasonable. Perhaps no one knew of the condition and the outcry when it 
was discovered would have persuaded the testator to abrogate it – had he been alive to do so.”). 
134 See In re Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 129 (Orphans’ Court 1964); National City Bank v. Case 
Western Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Common Pleas 1976). 
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destruction of property—courts often bar testators from doing via will what those same 
testators could have done had they lived.135  
 Both Hirsch’s argument and Posner’s argument have some force. The arguments 
make presumptions, however, that might be unwarranted. More precisely, both suppose 
that (1) a living donor’s destruction of property will be noticed by those who would 
prefer that the property be preserved; (2) a living donor who destroys property will be 
susceptible to persuasion or social sanctions; and (3) heirs and other affected third parties 
are more likely to want to see properties preserved than destroyed. It is not clear that all 
three presumptions would hold true in the most important potential property destruction 
cases. 
 First, chattel property usually can be destroyed surreptitiously by a living owner, 
and there is little reason to think that owners will generally consult third parties before 
electing to destroy the chattels in question. Indeed, to the extent that living people care 
about what people will think about them after their passing, directing the destruction of a 
chattel via will probably attracts more attention than destroying it during life. Because 
posthumous chattel destruction must be spelled out precisely in a will, one anticipates 
that some testators who feel their heirs will object to this destruction will be deterred 
from putting destructive instructions in their wills. To them, surreptitious destruction 
during life will be the preferred route—heirs would never learn about what they had lost. 
 Second, in many instances, the living owner of destroyed property will not stick 
around long enough to be ostracized. Take the paradigmatic home destruction case of 
Eyerman. By attempting to destroy the home via her will, Mrs. Johnston indeed escaped 
the social ostracism of her neighbors. But had she destroyed the home during her lifetime, 
said destruction would have required Mrs. Johnston to move elsewhere, where she 
similarly would have escaped her neighbors’ disapproval. Since it appears that Mrs. 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Carolyn L. Dessen, The Troubled Relationship of Will Contracts and Spousal Protection: Time 
for an Amicable Separation, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 435, 473-75 (1996) (discussing the law of elective 
shares); John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1039-45 (1994) (arguing that a 
state would have more leeway in regulating the testamentary disposition of frozen sperm than it would in 
regulating a living donor’s use of his sperm). Clare Gittings discusses the long history of English law 
ignoring the wishes of decedents regarding the character of their funerals. GITTINGS, supra note 35, at 86-
88. 
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Johnston’s relatives, the would-be beneficiaries, did not object to the home’s razing, it is 
not clear that she would have suffered serious social repercussions in the wake of the 
destruction.136 Presumably, the only opportunities for norm enforcement would have 
occurred during the window of time necessary for obtaining a demolition permit. Further, 
it seems plausible that the someone who destroys her habitable home is the type of 
nonconformist who is generally immune to peer pressure from neighbors. Even close-knit 
communities contain deviants, whose imperviousness to reputational sanctions threatens 
the efficacy of informal mechanisms for social control.137  
 Third, there are important cases where heirs and other third parties may prefer to 
see a testator’s valuable property destroyed, and where disregarding owners’ 
testamentary wishes can result in increased destruction and social waste. Here I am 
thinking about transplantable organs, a type of property that will figure prominently in 
the rest of the paper. As the discussion that follows suggests, the law may encounter 
substantial difficulties in trying to confront deeply imbedded, profoundly inefficient pro-
destruction norms.  
When a young man or woman is killed in an automobile accident, society suffers 
a terrible loss. Yet in most cases, an even more senseless loss transpires in the hours 
following death. That deceased young adult is likely to be able to contribute a “usable 
heart, pancreas, liver, two kidneys, two lungs, and intestines, . . . enough to save a half-
dozen or more lives in some cases.”138 But most transplantable organs in the United 
States are needlessly destroyed.139 As a result, there are more than 82,000 Americans on 
organ transplant waiting lists,140 and 6,000 Americans die preventable deaths every year, 
                                                 
136 524 S.W.2d at 218 (Clemens, J., dissenting) (“By its decision, the court officiously confers a ‘benefit’ 
on beneficiaries who have never litigated or protected against the razing.”). 
137 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 56-59 (1991). 
138 Richard Perez-Pena, Downside to Fewer Violent Deaths: Transplant Organ Shortage Grows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at A19. 
139 Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States, 349 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 667, 671 (Aug. 14, 2003) (finding that 42% of potential organ donors donate); Randi Hutter 
Epstein, How Diplomacy in Handling Death Can Save Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at D5 (same). For 
earlier statistics, see James F. Blumstein, Government’s Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, in ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY 5, 12-13 (James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds. 1989). 
140 Sheehy et al., supra note 139, at 668. 
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waiting for organs that never arrive.141 It is difficult to imagine a more perplexing waste 
of scarce societal resources.    
In the United States, the law by and large respects the wishes of those who want 
to have these valuable organs decompose along with their bodies.142 Indeed, the 
government makes it rather difficult for someone to avoid this senseless kidney 
destruction. An American wishing to donate his organs or the organs of a recently 
deceased relative generally must affirmatively opt in to organ donation, and this opt-in 
requirement substantially lowers donation rates.143 Although the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act provides that the decedent’s decision to donate his organs is decisive, hospitals 
typically will not harvest the decedent’s organs unless his family also consents, even 
where the decedent has signed an organ donor card.144 In many cases where a decedent 
has indicated a desire to donate his organs on his driver’s license, family objections 
                                                 
141 Perez-Pena, supra note 138, at A19. 
142 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act §§ 2(e) & 2(i) (1987); Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The 
Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69, 71-73 (1995). For an argument that the law provides too little protection for 
the testator who wishes to avoid having his organs used for transplant, see Paul M. Quay, S.J., Utilizing the 
Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 889, 891-895 (1984). 
143 Id. at 81-83; Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, in Organ 
Transplantation Policy, supra note 139, at 57, 60-61; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Liberal 
Paternalism Is not an Oxymoron, John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 185, May 2003, at 32-34 
(forthcoming in U. Chi. L. Rev.).  When the decedent has remained silent on his willingness (or lack 
thereof) to become an organ donor, the decedent’s next of kin may elect to donate his organs. See, e.g., 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151(a) (2003); Uniform Anatomical Gift Act § 3(a) (1987). But, again, if 
the next of kin are silent or cannot be located, donation typically will not occur. Daniel G. Jardine, 
Comment, Liability Issues Arising Out of Hospitals’ and Organ Procurement Organizations’ Rejection of 
Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1655. Some states have 
embraced limited exceptions to this regime. See, e.g., Maryellen Liddy, Note, The “New Body Snatchers”: 
Analyzing the Effect of Presumed Consent Organ Donation Laws on Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty, 28 
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 815, 826-29 (2001). 
144 Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal Considerations in 
Rejecting A Deceased’s Anatomical Gift Because There Is No Consent by the Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REV. 
323, 327-34, 337-42 (2002). Anthony J. Langone & J. Harold Helderman, Disparity Between Solid-Organ 
Supply and Demand, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 704, 704 (Aug. 14, 2003); Traci J. Hoffman, Comment, 
Organ Donor Laws in the U.S. and the U.K.: The Need for Reform and the Promise of 
Xenotransplantation, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 346 (2000); Donald D. Hensrud, Brother, Can 
You Spare a . . . , FORTUNE, May 26, 2003, at 176. This rule, assuming it is widely understood by members 
of the public, should create an ex ante effect, whereby those who wish to donate their organs take 
precautions to ensure that their relatives understand their wishes. Of course, many organ donors are killed 
unexpectedly, and did not previously want to contemplate their own premature demise, so the topic of 
organ donation may never come up in conversation.  
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prevent the transplantation of organs.145 Finally, in cases where a decedent has multiple 
next of kin (e.g., a parent survived by several children), the objections of any one relative 
can prevent a transplant as a practical matter.146 In short, either a decedent or his heirs 
usually can block physicians from transplanting his organs. The impediments that 
American law and custom place in the path of the socially responsible would-be donor 
are substantial.  
Maybe a moral society should implement a stringent anti-destruction rule barring 
posthumous destruction to prevent this waste. The government might, for example, 
nationalize the cadavers of all those who perish in the United States, and allow for burial 
or cremation only after any usable organs have been transplanted into those who need 
them most.147 The United States instead embraces the owner’s seemingly absolute right 
to destroy his own kidneys at death, and give heirs the right to destroy kidneys despite the 
decedent’s contrary wishes, regardless of the consequences that will be suffered by 
innocent third parties. Is this deferential attitude toward destructive wishes justifiable? 
Perhaps. Several sensible justifications for deferring to destructive wishes emerge. 
If many Americans view organ harvesting as an act of desecration, one that violates 
deeply held moral or religious convictions,148 then a government that attempts to use 
force to prevent organ destruction will encounter substantial social and political 
                                                 
145 Bucklin, supra note 144, at 337, 340-42; Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United 
States System of Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: “And 
the Winner Is . . .”, 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 32 n. 284 & 285 (1995); Hensrud, supra note 144, at 176. Although 
these sources all note that relatives do trump their relatives wishes to donate with some frequency, survey 
research shows that the majority of relatives usually honored a loved one’s wishes to donate if they knew 
about such wishes. Edward Guandagnoli et al., The Public’s Willingness to Discuss Their Preference for 
Organ Donation with Family Members, 13 CLIN. TRANSPLANTATION 342, 342 (1999).  
146 Bucklin, supra note 144, at 337. 
147 See A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Exploring the 
Alternatives, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 117, 123 (1993). Barnett & Kaserman, sensibly, note that kidney 
conscription “is likely to meet with overwhelming objections” from the public. Id. at 123 The governments 
of China and Serbia have instituted this kidney conscription regime with respect to executed prisoners. See 
Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ 
Donation, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 225 (2001) (“Currently, both China and Serbia are reported to remove 
organs from executed prisoners. What distinguishes nationalization of cadavers from presumed voluntary 
consent is the inability of the donor or family to ‘opt out’ of the donation.”).  
148 For an analysis of the religious context in which some organ donation occurs, see Khalil Jaafar Khalil, 
Comment, A Sight of Relief: Invalidating Cadaveric Corneal Donation Laws via the Free Exercise Clause, 
6 DEPAUL J. OF HEALTH CARE L. 159, 160-64 (2002). 
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resistance from the relatives of the deceased.149 Moreover, those who earnestly wish to 
keep their bodies intact may adopt death-bed strategies designed to thwart the 
government’s initiative, or may direct the removal of their bodies to friendlier 
jurisdictions. Finally, governmental exercises of the condemnation authority with respect 
to human body parts will strike many as inherently unacceptable.150 So while respecting 
the individual’s right to destroy his kidney seems highly questionable on welfarist 
grounds, a reasonable person might remain sympathetic to exercises of the right in light 
of the existence of a well-developed pro-destruction norm.  
What is the lesson from this diversion into the law of kidney donation? The law 
surely plays a role in discouraging organ donation, but that law appears at least somewhat 
responsive to existing norms. Effective organ transplantation is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and inefficient social and religious norms characterizing the removal of 
organs as bodily desecration have not been displaced completely.  Where a decedent has 
signed an organ donor card, and yet hospital employees refuse to honor the donor’s 
wishes because his next of kin object, the heirs are obviously more receptive to organ 
destruction than the decedent is.151 By giving both decedents and the next of kin a right to 
veto organ preservation, the law increases the odds that dominant pro-destruction norms 
will block the use of the organ for beneficial purposes. 
Now recall Hirsh’s discussion of norms and consider two alternative regimes. In 
regime 1, the would-be donor must disclose to his heirs apparent his intentions to donate 
his kidney upon his death in order for that choice to be effective. In regime 2, he may opt 
to donate his kidney secretly, for example, by filling out a form to be placed in his 
medical records. If the relatives are indeed more resistant to organ donation (because of 
                                                 
149 James F. Childress, Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for Transplantation, in 
Organ Transplantation Policy, supra note 139, at 87, 98-99; Hansmann, supra note 143, at 70. Even 
voluntary transactions with relatives might encounter substantial moral and practical difficulties. 
Hansmann, supra note 143, at 62. But see Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable? Or Is Utility 
the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683, 712-714 (advocating a market approach for the allocation 
of organs). 
150 See supra note 147. 
151 It is not clear that commodification of internal organs would solve this problem. If kidneys were 
commodified as part of the decedent’s estate, some heirs would be motivated to cash them in, but others 
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misplaced concerns about the appearance of the cadaver at an open-casket funeral, for 
example), then a disclosure requirement will result in added waste, because it will give 
these relatives an opportunity to dissuade the would-be donor from his intended course of 
action. A would-be donor who thought his donation would be socially beneficial might be 
surprised upon learning that his donation would enhance the grief likely to be 
experienced by his next of kin. Those heirs who would have felt uncomfortable trumping 
the deceased’s wishes to donate will feel much more comfortable destroying the organs if 
they can persuade their loved ones to change their minds during life. 
In sum, the supposition that Hirsch and Posner both make—that heirs and other 
third parties are likely to dissuade owners from destroying their property—may well be 
incorrect in the context of transplantable organs and socially valuable non-
commodities.152 It appears that peer pressure, persuasion, and socialization may operate 
to increase the destruction of these enormously valuable organs. For this reason, 
deference to the secretive, testamentary wishes of a decedent may well result in less 
waste than a regime that only respects the wishes of a decedent that were articulated to 
his kin prior to his death.   
D. A Sui Generis Solution? 
 Recall the recently covered terrain. Some people in society wish to use particular 
properties during their lifetimes and then direct the properties’ destruction upon their 
deaths. These preferences are apparently sincere, and savvy testators will expend 
resources trying to circumvent legal rules that prohibit posthumous destruction. In some 
of these cases—especially those involving wedding rings—it seems that because living 
people care about what happens to their bodies after their deaths, the would-be destroyers 
really are the resources’ highest value users. Perversely, well-informed testators 
sometimes destroy property prematurely because they recognize that death will deprive 
                                                                                                                                                 
would view the sale of those kidneys as the contemptible butchering of a parent’s body for financial gain. 
Commodification might therefore crowd out altruistic behavior. 
152 Indeed, their supposition may be true for valuable commodities as well. A testator might tell his spouse 
that he intends to pass on his wedding ring to her after he dies. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario 
whereby she tells him that she does not want it, and would prefer that he “keep it” for an eventual reunion 
in the afterlife.   
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them of the opportunity to destroy the property altogether. Limiting posthumous 
destruction therefore imposes substantial costs on society. 
 Yet persistent concerns that the dead have “nothing to lose” by destroying 
property make courts reluctant to permit testamentary destruction. To be sure, a 
sophisticated living testator does demonstrate her seriousness of purpose by foregoing the 
present income that could result from the sale of a future interest in the property. At the 
same time, some people will destroy their property because they do not realize that they 
have the opportunity to retain a life interest in it and sell the remainder for present cash, 
or they underestimate the amount of money that a remainder interest will fetch. And 
because the transaction costs of monitoring destruction via will are relatively low, the 
probate context seems like an appropriate opportunity for the state to assert its anti-waste 
policies.  
 Finally, destroying valuable property sometimes runs afoul of prevalent social 
norms in the United States, with wedding rings and biological material forming important 
exceptions. These norms may check individuals’ destructive impulses in life, but are 
ineffective once the would-be destroyer has died. Thus, the law might allow destruction 
by the living, while restricting destruction by the dead, as a means of ensuring that 
owners are willing to suffer the reputational sanctions that would accompany destruction.  
 Property law can respond to all these situations through a rather simple 
requirement: The law might provide that destructive instructions contained in wills will 
only be honored where the owner notified the public of the possibility that future interest 
in the property may be purchased. For example, a testator interested in destroying her 
home could be required to list a future interest in the home on eBay or a similar auction 
service. The advertisement would have to list detailed information about both the 
property in question and the life tenant herself.153 The testator would establish a 
minimum reserve price, and if no bid exceeded the reserve price, then the testator would 
not be obliged to sell to the high bidder. If the owner’s “reserve price” was exceeded by 
another bidder, or if the government decided to condemn the future interest, then the 
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property would be spared from destruction. But if no bid exceeded the would-be-
destroyers’ minimum asking price, then the owner would have demonstrated that she 
valued destruction of the work more than anyone else valued its preservation. Turning 
down the highest bid for a future interest would give owners safe harbor to destroy their 
property via will.   
 Note that this policy lever addresses all the concerns that have prompted the 
divergent legal treatment of testamentary and inter vivos destruction. From a welfarist 
perspective, where the owner of property has foregone a market price for the property’s 
future interest, he has earned the right to consume that future interest by destroying the 
property. He would be obtaining utility during the remaining years of his life. Moreover, 
the policy would substantially lower the transaction costs associated with monitoring 
living people’s decisions to destroy property. Marketing the future interests in the 
property would alert community members and heirs apparent to the owners’ intentions 
while they were still in a position to influence her to change her mind. 
 A major advantage of this approach is that it would facilitate the condemnation of 
properties that might benefit the community more generally. By acquiring a future 
interest, the government would be paying less than the full market value for the property 
in fee simple, while simultaneously ensuring that the property would be spared from 
destruction.154 Posthumous condemnation in right-to-destroy cases necessarily thwarts 
the wishes of the testator without conferring any meaningful benefit on her.155 
Condemnation during the testator’s lifetime thwarts her wishes too, but it at least 
provides her with money that she can enjoy during the rest of her life.   
 For all these reasons, the law should harmonize its treatment of inter vivos and 
posthumous destruction in cases where the posthumous destroyer has marketed the future 
                                                 
154 These cases, after all, are all instances in which the owner wishes to continue using the property during 
her lifetime, so there would be little risk that it would get destroyed while in the testator’s possession. After 
all, if the testator had wanted to destroy the property prior to her own demise, she could have done so. In 
any event, even if the testator changed her mind and sought immediate destruction, the doctrine of waste 
would prevent her from doing so. 
155 The testator’s estate receives the market value of the property that the state condemned. But the testator 
is dead, so the heirs are the sole beneficiaries of these proceeds. If the testator had wanted the heirs to 
receive this money, she would not have directed her executor to destroy the property at issue. 
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interest in the property and elected to forego the full market value of this future interest. 
Such a rule will make all testamentary destroyers behave like sophisticated market actors, 
and enable them to weigh the costs and benefits of property destruction.  
 This discussion raises the inevitable question of whether the same regime should 
apply to kidneys and other transplantable organs. I have, in the past, expressed 
reservations about the wisdom of commodifying human organs.156 Without getting into 
the contentious issue of whether it would be desirable to create a lawful market for 
kidneys, I will simply explore two possibly appealing aspects of this policy innovation in 
the kidney context. First, permitting a living donor to sell the right to harvest his organs 
upon his death is far less troubling than permitting a living donor to sell his kidney, 
effective immediately.157 Second, to the extent that many people are inclined to donate 
but do not do so because they are unaware of the need for kidneys or underestimate their 
worth, the process of marketing a future interest in one’s organs could solve both 
problems.158 So a law that permitted people to destroy their kidneys only if they had 
foregone the highest market price for a future interest might both serve an educational 
function for potential donors and their heirs. It could also help society differentiate 
between those who sincerely want their cadavers to remain intact, and those whose 
preferences are weak or default-rule-driven.  
IV. Destruction, Discourse, and Values 
 Having introduced the issue of organ transplantation, it is worth examining why 
that example upsets so many people’s intuitions about property destruction. Those who 
feel disdainful of Mrs. Johnston’s desire to destroy her home might empathize with her 
desire to avoid donating her liver, kidneys, or corneas. Those who are sympathetic to 
Johnston’s privacy- or sentiment-driven destruction of an unexceptional house might be 
                                                 
156 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying 
California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1294-96 (2000). 
157 Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 
G.W.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Hansmann, supra note 143, at 62-71. 
158 Or it could backfire, by causing an anti-commodification backlash. See Strahilevitz, supra note 156, at 
1295. 
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angered by the thought that her transplantable organs will go to waste, causing innocent 
third parties to die as a consequence. What is going on here? 
 The answer does not lie in the comparative values of the underlying assets. 
Indeed, the black market value of a young accident victim’s organs may well exceed the 
market value of all her real and personal assets. Nor can a satisfying answer rely on the 
prevalence of a pro-destruction norm for organs and an anti-destruction norm for houses. 
True, the norms here differ, but there seems to be substantial feedback between the law 
and social norms, and such analysis merely begs the question of whether the government 
should try to undermine an inefficient anti-destruction norm. 
 We can begin to address this puzzle by reflecting on what’s missing from both the 
Eyerman equation and the organ donation equation. In each case, the decedent seems to 
be destroying the asset at issue because of non-market, largely psychological 
considerations. In the organ donation case, religion, superstition, and aesthetic 
considerations may explain why someone would want his organs to decay upon his death. 
These considerations, even if based on ignorance, selfishness, spite, or a refusal to ponder 
one’s own morality, are deemed legally sufficient to justify enormous social waste. In the 
house case, one supposes that sentiment, expressive interests, or privacy concerns may 
have convinced the homeowner to destroy her home. Yet courts generally deem these 
interests insufficient to justify a less substantial waste of resources.  
On one view, there is nothing objectionable about courts deferring only to those 
destructive decisions that comport with widely shared norms. Yet if one considers the 
substantial expressive component that often accompanies decisions to destroy valuable 
resources, there is something troubling about disregarding the idiosyncratic views that 
prompt destructive acts.  
A. The Expressive Value of Destruction 
 In a nation whose colonists famously expressed their desire for independence by 
dumping large quantities of perfectly good tea into Boston Harbor, it should hardly be 
surprising that property destruction remains a common and effective means for 
communicating ideas and grabbing others’ attention. A student of American law will, 
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without much reflection, appreciate the expressive possibilities of property destruction 
upon realizing that several landmark First Amendment precedents revolve around the 
incineration of private property.159 Because the destruction of an American flag, a draft 
card, or a wooden cross conveys an obvious political or social agenda, courts 
contemplating property destruction in the First Amendment context have generally 
proved quite sympathetic to the interests of the destroyers.160 The Supreme Court has 
indicated, that to be communicative, an act of destruction must be more than “mindless 
nihilism,” rather, the destroyer must intend “to convey a particularized message” and it 
must be likely that the audience for the message would have understood it.161   
 Cases involving flag or draft card burning are easy in the sense that the expressive 
component of the destructive act is substantial and the monetary value of the underlying 
resource is insubstantial. Socially speaking, in a society that tolerates dissent, destruction 
of this kind of property appears to be a high-value use. There are, of course, harder cases. 
As Saddam Hussein’s control over Baghdad was disintegrating, American soldiers 
toppled a large statue of Hussein that had stood in Baghdad’s central square.162 Because 
the destruction of the statue apparently constituted a belligerent attack on a foreign 
                                                 
159 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (upholding the conviction of an anti-war 
protester who burned his selective service certificate in light of the government’s substantial interest in 
assuring the continued availability of these certificates); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) 
(holding that burning an American flag is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, an ordinance that 
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burning cross on someone else’s lawn, is that the burning cross represents the message that the speaker 
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160 O’Brien is the exception. The Court noted that selective service cards were useful in promoting the 
smooth administration of the draft process and in promoting communications between potential draftees 
and the selective service. 391 U.S. at 379-80.  
161 Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). The Third Circuit, relying on post-Spence 
case law, adopts a different test. See Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 160-61 (3d. 
Cir. 2002) (“[C]onduct is expressive if, considering the nature of the activity, combined with the factual 
context and environment in which it was undertaken, we are led to the conclusion that the activity was 
sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. . . . [T]his is a fact-sensitive, context-dependent inquiry, and . . . the putative speaker bears 
the burden of proving that his or her conduct is expressive.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Most other 
courts continue to adhere to the Spence test. Id. at 160 n.18.  
162 R.W. Apple Jr., A High Point in 2 Decades of U.S. Might, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A1. 
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nation’s cultural property in the absence of any military necessity, it seems likely that the 
statue’s destruction violated international law.163 American soldiers were destroying a 
statue that they did not own and had no need to eviscerate. But let us imagine that the 
statue had been toppled by its owner—a legitimate Iraqi government. In such 
circumstances, few would bemoan the statue’s destruction. Although the statue surely 
had some artistic value and perhaps significant historical value in memorializing a fallen 
regime, our concerns about waste would be outweighed by the expressive and symbolic 
value associated with this destruction. The destruction of the statue would be a liberating 
act, and few would begrudge an Iraqi government’s decision to destroy public property in 
order to send a particular message.164  
Similar examples abound. Former-Communist nations destroyed many Lenin 
statues in the years following the 1989 revolutions.165 A Jewish Group sunk a boat 
believed to be Hitler’s yacht off the Florida coast to commemorate the 50th Anniversary 
of the United States’ refusal to accept an ocean liner filled with Jews fleeing the Nazis.166 
A devout Catholic purchased Coubert’s anti-clerical Return from the Conference so that 
he could destroy it.167 The Rockefeller family destroyed a mural that Diego Rivera had 
painted for Rockefeller Center after the artist refused to remove Lenin’s image from the 
painting.168 Lady Churchill burned a portrait by an important artist that Parliament had 
presented to her husband in 1954.169 The Churchills hated the portrait, which they 
                                                 
163 See generally Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict, 14 HARV. 
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164 Joseph Sax recognizes the expressive possibilities of artwork destruction. SAX, supra note 7, at 17 
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Icons are Toppled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1991, at 1; David Remnick, The Day Lenin Fell on His Face, 
WASH. POST., Sep. 5, 1990, at D1; 
166 Associated Press, Sunk as Holocaust Symbol, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1989, at 2. Due to a crew member’s 
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167 SAX, supra note 7, at 19. 
168 SAX, supra note 7, at 13-16. 
169 Id. at 37. 
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believed portrayed Winston as a “gross and cruel monster,”170 and on at least one account 
the destruction of the portrait was a boon to Winston’s “peace of mind.”171 Various 
religious groups have challenged governmental restrictions on their demolition and 
renovation of their places of worship, citing the Free Exercise Clause.172 And, as 
mentioned at the outset of this article, the Harry Caray’s restaurant chain announced 
plans to destroy a historically significant baseball with a market value in excess of 
$100,000.173 
Now consider a much more disconcerting incident of expressive destruction: the 
Taliban’s destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan despite offers from foreign 
governments and museums to purchase some of the works.174 This destruction had an 
obvious religious motivation and meaning. By destroying the Buddhas, the Taliban were 
sending a powerful statement to Afghanis and Muslims worldwide. These were not 
irrational acts of destruction; they were rational acts that conveyed unmistakable and 
attention-getting messages. The fact that the cash-strapped Taliban spurned purchase 
offers from foreigners shows how much they valued the expressive opportunity. And yet, 
the same act of expression can be cast as an abhorrent, spiteful act. Still, given property 
destruction’s expressive value, barring messages deemed hostile to a person or group is 
potentially problematic.175   
                                                 
170 Id. at 38. 
171 Id. at 39. 
172 See, e.g., Rector of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990); Keeler v. 
Mayor and City Council, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996). California has exempted religious organizations 
from the burdens of its historical preservation laws for non-commercial property, evidently because of 
these concerns. This exemption has itself survived an Establishment Clause challenge. East Bay Asian 
Local Development Corp. v. California, 24 Cal. 4th 693 (2000). 
173 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
174 Robert Hughes, Buddha Bashing, Time: Asia, Aug. 20, 2003, available in 
<http://www.time.com/time/asia/arts/printout/0,9788,102096,00.html> (visited Sep. 20, 2003); Pre-Islam 
Idols Being Broken Under Decree by Afghans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A9. 
175 None of this suggests that the government cannot properly penalize those whose expressive conduct 
causes tangible harm to others that is unrelated to their sentiments concerning the expression itself. John 
Wilkes Booth’s yelling “sic semper tyrannis!” (thus always to tyrants) upon assassinating Lincoln hardly 
rendered the assassination protected conduct. By the same token, the performance artist who burns down 
his house is not immune from liability if the fire spreads to a neighboring lot. 
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 In all these cases, the destruction of valuable property contained a substantial 
expressive component. Humans are generally fascinated and intrigued when someone 
destroys a valuable commodity—the more valuable the resource, the more attention the 
destruction draws. Yet there is something unsettling about the nature of the expression 
here. Tearing down or obliterating a statue does send a powerful message that the 
“speaker” disagrees with the symbolic expression manifested in the work.176 But the 
destructive act is unlikely to contribute to a healthy public discourse or point society 
toward truth. Under a collectivist reading of the First Amendment, then, the government 
could regulate such destructive acts.177 To destroy a unique, irreplaceable178 piece of 
property is, in some ways, closer to heckling a speaker than responding to what he has to 
say. It may also deter others from devoting the necessary time and resources to future 
creative activities.179 So the law might differentiate between A, who gives a speech, and 
B, whose contribution to the debate is to ensure that no record of A’s speech survives. All 
the government is doing by temporarily privileging creation over destruction, is 
establishing a procedural rule that the artist who intends to make a lasting aesthetic 
contribution gets to “hold the floor” and cannot be cut off without his consent during his 
lifetime. If the First Amendment is about the nation’s commitment to producing a public 
debate that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”180 then the law might well view the 
symbolic destruction of irreplaceable property as low-value speech that can be restricted 
in order to facilitate the success of a deliberative process. 
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 Federal regulation of art destruction, probably unwittingly, has reinforced these 
collectivist themes. In 1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists’ Rights Act 
(“VARA”).181 Among other things, the law prohibits the destruction of visual art that is 
“of recognized stature” during the artists’ lifetimes.182 Artists can waive their VARA 
rights contractually,183 but the artist is unable to transfer his VARA rights to a third 
party.184  
Taken together, VARA’s anti-destruction provisions likely contribute to a robust 
public debate within the artistic community. VARA says that when an artist has made a 
substantial artistic contribution (by creating a work of recognized stature) it is 
inappropriate for an owner to destroy that work, even if he does so for expressive 
purposes, unless the artist consents to the destruction in writing. VARA thus recognizes 
that when an artist creates an important work of art, he generally intends to make a 
lasting contribution to aesthetic discourse. During the artist’s life, the work can be 
criticized or parodied, but it cannot be destroyed unless the artist consents. This regime is 
consistent with the collectivist conception of the First Amendment: Both creation and 
destruction convey messages and therefore have some value, but creation is generally 
more socially valuable than destruction, because creation contributes an idea whereas 
destruction usually wipes out an existing idea. After the artist has died, there is little 
expressive interest to be balanced against the living destroyer’s weak expressive interest, 
so destruction is permitted.185 VARA rights to prevent destruction must remain with the 
artist because it is the artist’s speech that is at issue. Those who have argued that VARA 
is unconstitutional have ascribed equal value to the creation of artwork and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
180 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). For an argument that this idea represents the 
core of the First Amendment’s values, see OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 22-25 (1996). 
181 17 U.S.C. § 106A. For an illuminating discussion of VARA’s effects, see William M. Landes, What Has 
the Visual Artist’s Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished?, 25 J. CULTURAL ECON. 283 (2001). 
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destruction of artwork,186 but a collectivist framework shows how the law can be 
reconciled with First Amendment principles. 
 Those who harbor more individual-autonomy oriented views of the First 
Amendment will have a more difficult time countenancing restrictions on property 
destruction that may have expressive consequences.187 From an individual rights 
perspective, it is difficult to see why Lady Churchill’s right to destroy a portrait she and 
her husband detest shouldn’t be given as much protection as the artist’s right to have his 
portrait preserved. Indeed, from a libertarian perspective, the destruction of the Buddhas 
of Bamiyan seems completely uncontroversial—the artists and workers who created these 
statues are long dead, and presumably lack any posthumous expressive interests, but the 
Taliban who ordered their destruction had cognizable expressive interests.188 
 Regardless of one’s animating theory of expressive conduct, there is a real danger 
of leakage here. If the law must defer to expressivist property destruction, but not to 
economically-motivated or spite-motivated property destruction, then sophisticated 
property owners who are motivated by economics will claim to be motivated by 
expressive interests.  Courts may have a difficult time judging owners’ actual 
motivations, and errors will be inevitable. Indeed, instances like the Buddhas of Bamiyan 
destruction show that spiteful acts can be spiteful expressions too. This is a substantial 
problem, and one that points in favor of a relatively unified treatment.  
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theorists, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First 
Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 311-24 (2003). 
188 When dealing with human-looking statues like the Buddhas of Bamiyan, our outrage over their 
destruction may stem from a subconscious tendency to ascribe rights to the artworks themselves. The 
Buddhas of Bamiyan are inanimate objects, but they look like people, and so we may be more revolted by 
their destruction than we would be by the destruction of a building of similar antiquity and historical 
importance.  
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B. If I Made You, Can I Destroy You? 
Does a creator have more leeway to destroy a piece of property than an ordinary 
owner who acquires the property via purchase, inheritance, or gift? Joseph Sax says yes, 
at least in the case of works of art, because an “artist should be entitled to decide how the 
world will remember him or her.”189 I agree with his bottom line, but for somewhat 
different reasons. 
The question is no academic one. Creators often attempt to destroy their property. 
This paper has already discussed the widespread destruction of private papers by various 
American Presidents. We find an analog to this destructive intent among great writers and 
artists. Franz Joseph Kafka, famously, decided to have his unpublished manuscripts, 
letters, and diaries destroyed while he was in a sanitarium, dying of tuberculosis. To that 
end, he wrote his executor and friend, Max Brod, two separate notes directing him to 
burn, unread, all Kafka’s writings immediately.190 In addition to these notes, Kafka had 
verbally directed Brod to destroy his written works.191 Included in the materials Kafka 
                                                 
189 SAX, supra note 7, at 200. Sax would not necessarily accord public figures who create historical 
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There is a debate concerning Kafka’s sincerity. Litowitz suggests that when Kafka verbally instructed Brod 
to destroy the unpublished works, Brod refused, so Kafka must have understood that Brod would not 
destroy the writings after Kafka’s death. Id. Brod himself suggested that he did not know whether Kafka 
was being insincere, but that he thought Kafka understood he would have never destroyed Kafka’s works 
even if he had known that Kafka steadfastly wished their destruction. See Max Brod, Postscript to the First 
Edition of Franz Kafka’s The Trial, in WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE & 
ETHICS 3 (1972). That said, a dying Kafka did burn many of the manuscripts to which he had access, a fact 
Brod found lamentable. Id. at 4. (“Unhappily Kafka performed the function of his own executor on part of 
his literary estate. In his lodgings I found ten large photo notebooks – only the covers remained; their 
contents had been completely destroyed. In addition to this he had, according to reliable testimony, burned 
several writing pads.”). Had he not been confined to a tuberculosis sanitarium during most of the final years 
of his life, Kafka would have had the opportunity to burn the other works as well. 
 It does not appear that the doubts over Kafka’s true intentions made any difference. Brod quite 
candidly admitted that he would not have destroyed the writings even if he had known that Kafka 
adamantly wished to see them destroyed. Id. (“My decision [rests] solely on the fact that Kafka’s 
unpublished work contains the most wonderful treasures, and, measured against his own work, the best 
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asked Brod to destroy were the only copies of his two still-unpublished masterpieces, The 
Castle, and The Trial. Brod “did not honor his friend’s last wish.”192 Instead, he edited 
and published Kafka’s novels, short stories, diaries, and other writings.  
Kafka’s dying wishes of artistic destruction were not unusual. The author 
Jacqueline Susann similarly directed her executor to burn her diaries upon her passing. 
The diaries had been valued at $3.8 million.193 Virgil evidently wanted the only written 
copy of the Aeneid burned upon his death, but he may have changed his mind after 
friends convinced him that Augustus would never allow such destruction.194 In 1954, an 
obscure artist decided to destroy all 24 of the paintings he had previously executed, as a 
way of “beginning afresh with a blank canvas.”195 Within a year that artist, Jasper Johns, 
would produce a world-famous painting of the American flag and become one of the 
most talked-about artists of his era.196 More recently, Brett Weston, a well-known 
photographer, publicly incinerated a lifetime’s worth of valuable negatives to 
commemorate his eightieth birthday.197  
 Suppose the Kafka case, or something like it, had been litigated. Let us imagine a 
modern-day American Kafka, who we’ll call “K,” and a will that is being probated. Say 
the will contains unambiguous instructions for Brod to destroy all copies of K’s unwritten 
work. And yet Brod approaches the court seeking direction. Brod argues that the texts 
have great literary and commercial value, and that to destroy them would constitute an 
unconscionable waste. What should a court do? Judge Posner states that these types of 
cases arise commonly, and that courts typically strike the direction to destroy the papers 
                                                                                                                                                 
things he has written. In all honesty I must confess that this one fact of the literary and ethical value of what 
I am publishing would have been enough to decide me to do so, definitely, finally, and irresistibly, even if I 
had had no single objection to raise against the validity of Kafka’s last wishes.”). 
192 Ackerman, supra note 190, at 105. 
193 See Sykas, supra note 27, at 926.  
194 See Hirsch, supra note 27, at 76 n 157 (quoting Brooks Otis, Virgil 1 (1964)); Sykas, supra note 27, at 
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197 See infra note 203. 
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on the grounds of public policy.198 Say our hypothetical court embraces this approach, 
and directs Brod to publish the valuable K works, with the proceeds to be distributed 
among K’s named beneficiaries. Is this the right result? I submit that the K papers and 
manuscripts should be destroyed, on the basis of any of four rationales.  
 First, we might reiterate the ex ante argument. A society that does not allow 
authors to have their draft works destroyed posthumously could have less literary product 
than a society that requires the preservation of all literary works not destroyed during the 
author’s life. Protecting authors’ rights to destroy should encourage high-risk, high-
reward projects, and might prevent writers from worrying that they should not commit 
words to paper unless they have a complete vision of the narrative structure for their 
work.199 Indeed, the society that respects the dead author’s wish for his unfinished 
writings to be burned avoids putting the ailing artist in the terrible position of having to 
burn unfinished works that might be completed if the artist recovers. In the past, great 
artists have erred on the side of destruction out of the fear that the unfinished works will 
tarnish their reputations.200  
Second, we might accept an economic rationale. K is in the best position to 
determine which of his works should form his artistic legacy. K has an economic interest 
(via his concern for the welfare of his beneficiaries) in assuring that the value of his 
published works is not diminished by the conceivably inferior quality of the unpublished 
works. The law, after all, does not force Prada to ship its irregular or substandard clothing 
to discount sellers. Rather, it lets Prada opt for a reputation as a maker of high-status, 
invariably high-quality garments. By the same token, the court should defer to K’s 
                                                 
198 POSNER, supra note 132, at 559 (“[A] common case is where a writer in his will directs his executor to 
destroy his unpublished manuscripts. These directions are usually disobeyed.”).  
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judgment about what actions will maximize the value of his estate.201 Since K’s heirs 
would have the same economic interest in the value of his collective works, they should 
have the same opportunities to destroy works that might diminish his reputation.202  
 Third, and relatedly, we might shoehorn K’s wishes into the types of expressive 
theories so far discussed. K may wish to send a message to the public, by destroying his 
unfinished works, that he is not the type of artist who will tolerate, let alone publish, 
inferior works.203 A dramatic destruction of K’s unfinished works would certainly garner 
the public’s attention. Brod’s publicized destruction of the work that had taken so much 
of K’s time would perhaps rekindle public interest in those few works that K thought 
were worthy of publication.  
 There is another expressive component to K’s destruction, and it deviates 
substantially from the expressive theories previously explored. If a court decides to bar 
Brod from destroying K’s unpublished works, it is forcing the departed K to speak when 
he would have preferred to remain silent. From a First Amendment perspective, a judicial 
remedy barring the destruction of literary documents would be problematic if it occurred 
during K’s life.204 K’s death might well obviate the possibility of a constitutional 
violation, but the state’s action of forcing a dead person to share his private, written 
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words still seems to run afoul of the principles underlying the First Amendment right to 
remain silent.205 A holding that public policy bars the destruction of valuable unpublished 
papers gives too much weight to some policy interests (avoiding waste) and no weight to 
seemingly weightier interests (avoiding compelled speech). 
C. Biological Exceptionalism? 
 In an analogous set of cases, courts have recognized the problem with forced 
creative activity and have come down squarely on the side of the right to destroy. Indeed, 
the procreative context has seen perhaps the greatest degree of judicial deference to an 
individual’s right to destroy. These decisions are in many respects remarkable, and reveal 
an alternative way for courts to balance the individual’s right to destroy property against 
society’s interest in avoiding the waste of scarce resources.  
In the past decade or so, several state supreme courts have been called upon to 
resolve disputes among divorcees concerning the disposition of cryogenically frozen 
embryos. The first such case in the United States was Davis v. Davis,206 a 1992 decision 
by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis were a married 
couple who were unable to conceive a child naturally. The couple then tried in vitro 
fertilization; Ova were removed from Mary Sue, they were fertilized with Junior’s sperm 
in a Petri dish, and then some of them were transferred back into Mary Sue’s uterus for 
implantation. The remaining fertilized embryos were frozen cryogenically for subsequent 
implantation.207 The couple’s initial efforts to conceive were unsuccessful, and Junior 
filed for divorce in February of 1989.208  
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Junior and Mary Sue agreed on all terms of the dissolution save one: custody of 
the remaining frozen embryos.209 Mary Sue wanted to donate the embryos to a childless 
couple, and Junior wanted the embryos to be destroyed.210 The trial court held the interest 
in preserving the embryo’s viability to be paramount and directed that Mary Sue receive 
custody of the embryos so as to ensure that the potential children be given a chance to 
survive through implantation.211 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Junior 
Davis had a constitutional right to avoid fatherhood in these circumstances.212 
The Tennessee Supreme Court then sought to balance Mary Sue’s interest in 
avoiding the destruction of the embryos and of “knowing that the lengthy . . . procedures 
she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to which she contributed genetic 
material would never become children”213 against Junior’s interest in avoiding “unwanted 
parenthood . . . , with all its possible financial and psychological consequences.”214 The 
court ultimately held that Junior’s interest in avoiding parenthood trumped Mary Sue’s 
interest in seeing the embryos preserved, and, more generally, that “[o]rdinarily, the party 
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a 
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by [other] means.”215 A number of other 
courts have been called upon to resolve similar conflicts, and in most instances, the court 
has sided with the party seeking to destroy the embryo.216 In none of the cases did the 
court force someone to become a parent without that person’s consent.217  
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 Reading Davis and the other procreation cases, one is struck by the variations 
between those opinions and other opinions involving the right to destroy property. The 
right to destroy frozen embryos is deemed a paramount right because of its linkage to a 
constitutional privacy right to avoid procreating. In none of the cases does the court place 
any weight on society’s interest in avoiding the destruction of a human pre-embryo. 
Indeed, there is no discussion of the various childless couples who could benefit from 
embryo donation, and Davis went so far as to say that a mother who wanted to have the 
embryo implanted in her own uterus would have a stronger claim than a parent who 
wanted to donate the embryo to an infertile couple.218 The libertarian tone of these 
opinions is unmistakable, and the courts’ concern for the interests of third parties 
(including the frozen potential human life, infertile couples, and research scientists) is 
nonexistent.  
 Consider the implications of this analysis for the questions surrounding the 
posthumous publication of K’s manuscripts. The embryo destruction cases suggest that 
the constitutional right to not procreate trumps a partner’s constitutional right to 
procreate. By the same token, one might argue that the writer’s right to avoid speaking 
(i.e., to direct the destruction of one’s unpublished works) ought to trump any societal 
interest in disseminating artistic speech.  
In cases where the state is called upon to decide whether a document is to be 
published against the author’s will, there may be good reasons to defer to the author’s 
choice, even if the result is the incineration of the only surviving copies of The Castle and 
The Trial. That said, both lines of authority seem to be ignoring something important. In 
the posthumous publication cases, the artist’s privacy and expressive interests have to be 
balanced against the social value that might result from publication. In the procreation 
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cases, it is improper for the courts to ignore the potential benefits of embryo preservation 
to an infertile couple that would like to conceive children.   
 V. Conclusion 
 The recent trend in American law has been to curtail property owners’ traditional 
rights to destroy their own property. Given Joseph Sax’s advocacy for a hastening of that 
trend, it makes sense to review the law regarding property destruction and evaluate 
whether limiting owners’ rights to destroy is socially beneficial.  
 Those who wish to curtail the right to destroy base their argument almost 
exclusively on the resource waste that results from property destruction. Usable resources 
may be squandered, neighborhoods may empty, and historians may have more difficulty 
studying artistic, political, or cultural traditions. These are all substantial concerns. But I 
have argued that prohibiting people from destroying their property can result in waste 
too. Historic preservation laws can lock existing, inefficient, land uses into place. Rules 
barring patent suppression can discourage firms from investing in innovations. 
Precedents barring the posthumous destruction of unfinished writings can encourage 
premature shredding by ailing writers or discourage scholars from committing unfinished 
thoughts to paper. Rules requiring presidents to preserve all presidential papers can deter 
public officials from memorializing controversial or sensitive ideas. To be sure, certain 
kinds of anti-destruction rules will do more harm than good, but a review of the case law 
leaves one with little confidence that courts will be able to overcome loss aversion or 
adequately analyze ex ante incentives created by legal rules. 
 Courts have continued to give living owners some leeway in destroying their 
property, while ordering executors to disregard destructive instructions contained in wills. 
The stated basis for this hostility to posthumous destruction is the idea that only a living 
owner will suffer the consequences of his act, and self-interest will deter most living 
owners from destroying valuable resources. On this account, the courts can disregard 
destructive will provisions because the testator never “put her money where her mouth 
was.” I argue that this account is incorrect. The testator’s refusal to sell a future interest in 
the destroyed property during her life demonstrates her willingness to forego present 
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income to secure the property’s destruction. If testators are fully informed and rational, 
they have the proper incentives to avoid destroying valuable property capriciously. To 
that end, I propose a legal regime whereby testators would be privileged to destroy non-
landmarked properties if they marketed a future interest in the property and turned down 
the highest price offered for that future interest. The only exception to this rule would 
arise in situations where the government elected to exercise its condemnation authority. 
In cases involving wedding rings, family heirlooms, personal papers, and sometimes even 
homes, individuals seem to gain substantial utility from knowing that they can “take their 
property with them” upon their passing. As long at it can be assured of their sincerity and 
testamentary capacity, the government usually ought not to prevent these people from 
directing the destruction of their property via will. 
 The paper then uses the destruction of internal organs and frozen embryos as a 
starting point for an examination of the expressive benefits associated with destruction. 
Rational people usually do not destroy valuable property intentionally. So where the 
government witnesses a rational person destroying his valuable property, it should 
presume that the destructive act furthers expressive or religious objectives. This 
deferential approach still raises the question of whether religious or expressive interests 
should trump the usual concerns about wasted resources and associated negative 
externalities. 
 Cases that require courts to balance religious or expressive interests against 
substantial economic or social welfare interests may become very difficult. Courts have 
an unfortunate tendency to try to make them easier by disregarding the interests on one 
side of the equation. For example, cases involving the destruction of frozen embryos 
ignore the interests of infertile couples who would like to preserve the embryos for 
implantation. Similarly, the American law protects a deceased person’s right to destroy 
her transplantable organs upon her death, notwithstanding the enormous unnecessary loss 
of life that results. Indeed, in these cases, courts give no thought to the ordinary critiques 
of posthumous destruction. Finally, courts generally disregard the artist’s substantial First 
Amendment interests in ensuring that incomplete, inferior, or otherwise disfavored 
unpublished works in his collection be destroyed upon his passing.  
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 Congressional legislation on the destruction of visual art provides a more 
balanced, sophisticated approach to destruction cases where important interests exist on 
both sides. Under my collectivist reading of the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, the law 
privileges the creation of art over the destruction of art, while recognizing that both 
creative and destructive acts have expressive value. After the artist who created a work 
has died or contracted away his rights to prevent destruction, however, his expressive 
interests fade, and the interests of the owner who wishes to destroy a work to criticize its 
content or capture the public’s attention must prevail. Hence, the law’s protection of 
important new works by living artists, and its lack of protection for works by Old Masters 
constitutes puzzling economic regulation, but good free speech law. 
 Given the paper’s criticism of many common law cases involving the destruction 
of property, it seems appropriate to set forth how the major cases ought to have been 
decided. For the purposes of organizational clarity, the paper will examine the easier 
cases and harder cases in turn. 
A. Easy Cases 
 At some level, a right to destroy property is essential to the functioning of a 
market economy. A new refrigerator would be worth little or nothing if its owner was 
required to keep it working as a refrigerator ad infinitum. Similarly, if Hugo Boss is 
barred from destroying the imperfect suits that it produces, then it might see the value of 
all its remaining garments, and the business as a whole, fall as a consequence. These 
lessons suggest that property destruction often produces economic gains for its owner. 
Where a rational individual or business makes a plausible claim that the destruction of a 
valuable asset is wealth- or welfare-maximizing, limitations on the destruction of the 
property seem inappropriate.219 Exceptions arise only where the property in question is 
                                                 
219 There are, of course, instances in which people destroy objects that they believe to be worthless, and 
then come to regret the destruction after the fact. For example, middle-aged men frequently complain that 
their mothers threw away priceless baseball card collections during spring cleaning, and the prevalence of 
such destruction helps account for the rarity, and hence the value, of certain cards from the 1950s and 
1960s. James Werrell, Boomers Coping with Mountains of Clutter, ROCK HILL HERALD, July 12, 2002, at 
5A. Still, property destruction exists all around us, and it seems daft to limit or even monitor such 
destruction in order to rescue the occasional Mickey Mantle card that might be sitting in the bottom of 
someone’s trash bin. After all, the owner had a strong economic incentive to discover the property’s value 
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economically productive (albeit not optimally productive) and where it produces 
substantial enough positive externalities to offset the owner’s lost revenue. 
 Compare two historic preservation cases. In Ramsey,220 and J.C. & Associates,221 
once grand buildings had become money pits for their owners. Neither owner could 
renovate the properties and still turn a profit. Unless the state or the neighbors are willing 
to compensate the owner enough to make the continuation of the structure economically 
viable, the owner ought to have a right to tear down the building. Ramsey recognized this 
basic principle. J.C. & Associates did not. 
 Properties that generate little or no positive externalities also present easy cases. If 
the owner wants to destroy them, he ought to have the right to do so. Surely, such 
destruction can constitute resource waste. But because the waste does not harm third 
parties substantially, this waste is tolerable. As long as the owner has an incentive to 
preserve valuable properties, the transaction costs associated with trying to monitor and 
prevent this destruction will far exceed the value of any resources spared from waste. 
Hence, the living owner ought to be entitled to destroy his ordinary furniture, automobile, 
or vacuum cleaner, as long as his sanity is unquestioned. Similarly, someone who wishes 
his executor to destroy his property upon his death ordinarily ought to be entitled to do 
so, as long as he is of sound mind and body, and previously has put his money where his 
mouth is by foregoing the market price for a future interest in the property. 
Cases involving the destruction of unpublished work by that work’s owner and 
creator are easy too. There will certainly be waste associated with the destruction of such 
works—the Kafka writings demonstrate that. But on the whole, artists should decide 
which of their works should be presented to the world—they have the correct economic 
incentives and greater familiarity with their own work than anyone else. Disregarding an 
unambiguous destruction provision in a will raises the specter of compelled speech. 
Moreover, an anti-destruction rule creates perverse incentives for ailing artists to destroy 
                                                                                                                                                 
before destroying it, and any ex post regrets about a lost economic opportunity probably will train the 
owner to be more careful in the future.    
220 People ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 171 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. Ct. App. 1960).  
221 J.C. & Assoc v. District of Columbia Bd. of App. & Rev., 778 A.2d 296 (D.C. 2001). 
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works that they might not be able to finish during their lives and to avoid committing 
high-risk thoughts to paper until they have fully conceptualized the entire project. 
Most cases involving the burial of family heirlooms or wedding rings with a 
decedent are easy as well. Ordinary people seem to get a lot of utility, during life, from 
the thought that they will be buried wearing a wedding ring, or that a particularly 
sentimental item will be deposited in their casket. On a personhood account of property, 
one can say that these properties are likely to have merged with the decedent.222 A loyal, 
deceased spouse, then, really is the highest-value user of a valuable wedding ring. Hence 
the norm permitting such burials, rather than Meksras’s harsh-anti-destruction rule, 
follows the proper approach. That said, there is a point at which the destruction may 
become excessive, and the law can, in the absence of a bona fide religious custom, 
require the decedent to designate only the few objects that mean the most to her for 
burial. There is little plausible economic benefit associated with permitting extravagant 
burials, and they might invite grave-robbing and prompt wasteful spending on graveyard 
security. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the market for jewels and heirlooms would 
be adversely affected if people were barred from taking them to the grave.223 Nor is it 
likely that a rule barring the interment of valuables will prompt people to destroy these 
jewels during their lifetimes. Given the low transaction costs of imposing anti-destruction 
rules on a tightly regulated industry, capping the value of such buried goods seems 
appropriate.  
A final class of easy cases arises when there are reasons to question the owner’s 
capacity for rational decision-making. When an owner of a valuable resource who is 
genuinely incapable of making rational decisions destroys the resource, no one benefits. 
In such circumstances, the state is plainly justified in intervening to protect the welfare of 
the owner and society as a whole. As long as the costs of evaluating the owner’s 
                                                 
222 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
223 The market for those types of property that all people expect to take with them to the grave would be 
adversely affected by restrictions on the right to destroy property. Coffins, which are created for the 
purpose of being destroyed, are the quintessential example. See generally Ware v. State, 121 S.E. 251, 251 
(Geo. Ct. App. 1924) (affirming the larceny conviction of a man who dug up a grave, removed the coffin, 
and reinterred the cadaver, with the intent of re-using the coffin in a subsequent funeral); see also text 
accompanying note 167 (discussing the purchase of art for the express purpose of destroying it). 
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decision-making capacity do not dwarf the value of the affected resources, the law ought 
to bar destruction.  
B. Hard Cases  
 The law defers to destructive impulses that are widely shared and typically 
ignores more idiosyncratic destructive requests. Hence, someone’s expressed wish to 
allow her organs to decay after her demise will be respected in every jurisdiction, but her 
expressed wish to have her house destroyed upon her death will be thwarted by most 
courts. This divergence appears to have little to do with the act-omission distinction: If 
someone were to order her executors to leave her cat in her empty house for 60 days, 
without food or water, then this omission would surely be invalidated by the court 
because it would result in the cat’s death. Rather, norms seem to explain the divergent 
treatment of kidneys and houses. Thus, one supposes that if the norms were reversed, 
such that posthumous home destruction was common and posthumous organ destruction 
was rare, the law’s relative tolerance for these two kinds of destruction would flip as 
well.  
 There is some appeal to this approach. After all, laws that comport with dominant 
social norms can be enforced more efficiently than those that do not.224 But the law also 
plays an important and necessary role in shaping social norms,225 and it seems quite 
likely that the law is partially responsible for the unconscionable waste of transplantable 
organs that kills thousands of Americans every year. There is no justification for a legal 
presumption that usable organs should be destroyed where relatives fail to object to their 
removal. In sixteen percent of all cases involving transplantable organs, no transplant 
occurs because families are never asked whether they are willing to donate the organs.226 
Here the law and prevailing practices are perplexing. A decedent’s unambiguous 
instructions to destroy a home or diary are disregarded, but parents are presumed to 
                                                 
224 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
607, 607-09 (2000); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1998-99, 2006-08 
(2000). 
225 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910 (1996). 
226 Sheehy et al., supra note 139, at 671. 
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believe that their children’s valuable organs should be destroyed.227 A better rule would 
permit organ destruction only in those cases where the decedent or a majority of his heirs 
has requested such action unambiguously.   
The government’s goal has to be the inculcation of an anti-destruction norm 
among American citizens. As suggested above, there are probably ways of accomplishing 
this that will spark less resistance than a rule depriving the deceased (and their heirs) of 
control over transplantable organs. But if these measures are tried and fail, then it seems 
sensible to hold that the deceased no longer have property rights228 in their transplantable 
organs, and those organs should be transferred to the people whose lives they will save. 
 And what about houses and other structures? Where the structure retains genuine 
historical or architectural value, and has been landmarked through the ordinary processes, 
then destruction is plainly inappropriate. If the house has substantial market value, but 
does not produce substantial positive externalities, then its owner ought to have the right 
to destroy it, either during her lifetime, or via will if she has marketed a future interest in 
the property and foregone the highest bid. The case for permitting the destruction of 
structures is weakened to some degree, however, because the transaction costs of 
monitoring building destruction are so low. For that reason, it would be appropriate for 
the government to condemn the property from the decedent’s estate, and then re-sell it to 
the highest bidder. The sovereign always has this power, and it can exercise it to protect a 
neighborhood’s tax base and housing supply. In short, legislatures, not courts, are the 
appropriate body to prevent the waste associated with the destruction of structures.  
 The cases considering the destruction of pre-embryos are particularly challenging 
because there are weighty societal interests on both sides of the issue. Recall the facts of 
Davis. Mary Sue wanted to donate the fertilized embryos to a childless couple and Junior 
wanted them destroyed. Mary Sue had a strong interest in preventing the destruction of 
                                                 
227 This destructive presumption is particularly maddening in light of the statistics showing that when 
families are asked to donate their loved ones’ organs, 58% agree to do so and 42% refuse. See statistics 
drawn from id. (noting that, among those asked to donate, donors outnumber refusers by a 54 to 39 ratio). 
228 The law generally refers to quasi-property rights in bodies of decedents, because of discomfort with the 
notion of property in the human body. Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey M. Price, First Moore, then Hecht: 
Isn’t It Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells & Gametes?, 37 REAL PROPERTY, 
PROBATE & TRUST J. 151, 172 (2002); Quay, supra note 142, at 914-15. 
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her potential progeny, but Junior had an equally strong interest in avoiding unwanted 
fatherhood. As in the organ donation cases, society had a powerful interest in permitting 
the embryos’ transfer to a couple that was otherwise unable to conceive. Finally, a pro-
destruction or anti-destruction ruling would have important ex ante effects. In cases 
where a sperm donor and egg donor disagree about the disposition of the embryo, either 
rule could change the ways in which eggs were extracted from the mother or prompt 
marginal parties to forego the in vitro fertilization process altogether. Indeed, given the 
nature of the fertilization process, courts cannot fall back on the general rule regarding 
such disputes that the wishes of the potential mother should trump the conflicting wishes 
of the potential father.229 Because the embryos cases are so close and contentious, New 
York’s approach in Kass v. Kass230 seems to be the best solution—parties shall be 
required to agree at the time of the procedure upon the disposition of the fertilized 
embryo in the event that one party no longer desires implantation, and any such 
agreement will be enforced.  
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229 Courts generally will not force prospective mothers to have abortions at the fathers’ request, nor will 
they prevent women from having abortions if their partners want the fetus carried to term. See generally 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of Paternal Bonding in the Law of Family 
Relations, 33 IND. L. REV. 691, 717-725 (2000) (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect 
to a prospective father’s right to prevent an abortion). These rules are sensible in light of the disparate costs 
that pregnancy (and often child-rearing) impose on mothers. 
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